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Handbook of the History of Logic: - Fordham University Faculty

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222 Terence Parsons<br />

7 MODES OF SUPPOSITION: THE EARLY VIEW<br />

7.1 Modes <strong>of</strong> Personal Supposition<br />

Personal supposition occurs when a term is used to stand for things that it signifies<br />

(according to nominalists) or for things that fall under <strong>the</strong> form that it signifes.<br />

Terms with personal supposition may be divided into those that have discrete<br />

supposition and those that have common supposition. Discrete supposition is<br />

possessed by singular terms that are used personally. This includes proper names,<br />

such as ‘Socrates’ or a simple demonstrative such as ‘that’ when it is <strong>the</strong> whole<br />

term making up a denoting phrase, or a whole complex demonstrative such as<br />

‘that donkey’ when it is <strong>the</strong> whole term making up a denoting phrase. Common<br />

supposition is <strong>the</strong> kind <strong>of</strong> supposition that a common term has when it is <strong>the</strong><br />

whole term making up a denoting phrase (usually) with a quantifier word.<br />

A common term which is used personally has what is called a mode <strong>of</strong> (common)<br />

personal supposition. 73 A mode <strong>of</strong> supposition is something like a kind <strong>of</strong><br />

quantificational status. It is a status that a term has in a proposition based on<br />

where it occurs in <strong>the</strong> proposition and what quantifier word occurs with it. There<br />

are three modes <strong>of</strong> common personal supposition:<br />

• Determinate Supposition<br />

• (Confused and) Distributive Supposition 74<br />

• Merely Confused Supposition<br />

Determinate supposition has something to do with a term’s being existentially<br />

quantified; a paradigm example is ‘donkey’ in‘Some donkey is spotted’. Distributive<br />

supposition has something to do with a term’s being universally quantified;<br />

a paradigm <strong>of</strong> distributive supposition is ‘donkey’ in‘Every donkey is spotted’.<br />

Merely confused supposition is nei<strong>the</strong>r <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>se; it needs to be discussed. (An<br />

example <strong>of</strong> a term with merely confused supposition is ‘donkey’ in‘Every animal<br />

is a donkey’.)<br />

Almost all authors agreed on <strong>the</strong> classification <strong>of</strong> terms <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Aristotelian standard<br />

forms <strong>of</strong> categorical propositions: 75<br />

73 Some authors (see Marsilius <strong>of</strong> Inghen 1 (57-59)) believe that terms used materially can<br />

also be assigned a mode <strong>of</strong> supposition, since <strong>the</strong>y are common terms. For example, in ‘Every<br />

donkey in that sentence is bisyllabic’ <strong>the</strong>word‘donkey’ is a common term that stands for any<br />

word spelled d-o-n-k-e-y. On this analysis, ‘donkey’ has distributive material supposition in that<br />

sentence. Most authors ei<strong>the</strong>r disagree with this view, or ignore it. According to some, even<br />

discrete terms used materially are common terms, and can have modes <strong>of</strong> supposition, as in<br />

‘Every this uttered this morning was <strong>the</strong> subject <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> sentence in which it occurred’.<br />

74 Some authors use ‘distributed’ and some use ‘distributive’; I use <strong>the</strong>se interchangeably. (The<br />

term ‘distributed’ may presuppose that a term cannot have that mode <strong>of</strong> supposition unless it<br />

has been distributed by some distributing sign; see section 7.5 below.)<br />

75 Exception: Peter <strong>of</strong> Spain T VI.6 (70-71) held that all predicates have simple supposition,<br />

and do not have any mode <strong>of</strong> personal supposition. Some authors did not discuss <strong>the</strong> predicates<br />

<strong>of</strong> particular negatives.

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