Handbook of the History of Logic: - Fordham University Faculty

214 Terence Parsons
The subject is ampliated to possible things (including things that exist
at any time).
The predicate is also ampliated; what it is ampliated to depends on
the mode.
There is no other effect.
Examples:
Every animal possibly-is a donkey ⇒ (Every possible animal x)(Some
possible donkey y) x is y
Every animal necessarily-is a donkey ⇒ (Every possible animal x)(Some
necessary donkey y) x is y
But which things does a term like ‘possible donkey’ supposit for? Presumably
a possible donkey is an entity that is possibly a donkey. This will include all
actual donkeys, past present and future — since modal words are explicitly said
to ampliate their supposition to the past, present, and future. It will probably
not include any other actual things, since e.g. a rock has an essence of its own
which lies outside the category of donkeys. (This depends on what view you have
about necessary properties. I am assuming what I think is the most usual view,
attributed to Aristotle.) Will it include never-existing things that are possible
donkeys? So far as I can see, the semantic theory is neutral on this. If there
are such things, then ’donkey’ signifies them, and it supposits for them in modal
propositions.
What then about necessary donkeys, which are needed for the second sentence.
This will include all actual donkeys if each donkey is necessarily a donkey. (Although
there may be none, since something that is necessarily a donkey necessarily
exists.) Again, it will probably not include any other actual things. Again, there
is a question as to whether there are also non-actual necessary donkeys. Perhaps
these coincide with the non-actual possible donkeys (on Aristotle’s view — though
probably not on contemporary views). Again, that is a metaphysical view that
the semantic theory is neutral on.
5.4 Ampliation due to Words which pertain to the soul
This doctrine is simple: the use of words which pertain to the soul ampliate
certain terms so that they may supposit for everything that those words signify.
For example, in ‘The antichrist is opinable’ the adjective permits the subject
to supposit for future things, so the subject is not empty. Since one may have
opinions about the antichrist, the proposition is true. ‘Some person thinks of a
gold mountain’ can be true because the verb ampliates the predicate. However,
‘Socrates thinks of the antichrist’ is not true, since the verb does not ampliate the
subject term, and Socrates does not exist; so the proposition is false.