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Handbook of the History of Logic: - Fordham University Faculty

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332 Henrik Lagerlund<br />

<strong>the</strong> conclusion. A dialectical syllogism, however, is one that produces<br />

opinion on <strong>the</strong> basis <strong>of</strong> probable [premises]. Finally, a sophistical syllogism<br />

is one that ei<strong>the</strong>r syllogizes on <strong>the</strong> basis <strong>of</strong> seemingly probable<br />

[premises] or seemingly syllogizes on <strong>the</strong> basis <strong>of</strong> probable [premises];<br />

in ei<strong>the</strong>r case it is strictly aimed at glory and victory. 91<br />

This division is very similar to Al-Ghazālī’s discussed above. William never deals<br />

with demonstrative syllogisms, however, but, as Peter, turns to <strong>the</strong> dialectical ones<br />

after having outlined <strong>the</strong> <strong>the</strong>ory <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> syllogisms.<br />

The treatment <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> loci (or topoi) in thirteenth century textbooks deals with<br />

<strong>the</strong> same issues as Aristotle dealt with in <strong>the</strong> Topics, but <strong>the</strong> medieval discussions<br />

<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Topics had changed quite a lot, however, and it was Boethius that set <strong>the</strong><br />

subject matter <strong>of</strong> this part <strong>of</strong> logic for <strong>the</strong> Middle Ages. The textbooks author’s<br />

discussion <strong>of</strong> loci is hence based on Boethius’ discussion in De differentiis topicis.<br />

Peter <strong>of</strong> Spain defines an argument in <strong>the</strong> following way:<br />

An argument is <strong>the</strong> ratio that makes a doubtable thing credible.<br />

The ratio, or <strong>the</strong> reason’, is <strong>the</strong> medium for deriving or reaching <strong>the</strong> conclusion <strong>of</strong><br />

<strong>the</strong> argument. The notion <strong>of</strong> a medium or a middle is brought out most explicitly<br />

in <strong>the</strong> <strong>the</strong>ory <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> syllogisms where <strong>the</strong> middle term is <strong>the</strong> link between <strong>the</strong><br />

extreme terms. The conclusion <strong>of</strong> an argument is an approved proposition and<br />

before it was proved it was doubtable. This way <strong>of</strong> describing arguments from<br />

premise to conclusion is explicit in Aristotle’s Topics where <strong>the</strong> starting point is<br />

a question that is tested by <strong>the</strong> argument.<br />

An argumentation is an argument made explicit by a discourse, that is, <strong>the</strong><br />

discourse that explicates <strong>the</strong> argument. An argument differs from both a medium<br />

and an argumentation, Peter explains. A medium is called a medium because it<br />

has two extremes, while an argument adds to <strong>the</strong> medium <strong>the</strong> power <strong>of</strong> proving<br />

<strong>the</strong> conclusion. In order for <strong>the</strong>re to be an argument <strong>the</strong>re must be a medium<br />

able to prove <strong>the</strong> conclusion. The argumentation, however, is <strong>the</strong> whole discourse<br />

composed <strong>of</strong> premises and conclusion, and in an argumentation <strong>the</strong> power <strong>of</strong> an<br />

argument is manifested. The argumentation is thus <strong>the</strong> whole uttered discourse<br />

<strong>of</strong> premises and conclusion. It is an argument, which is proved by a medium from<br />

<strong>the</strong> two extremes in <strong>the</strong> premises.<br />

There are four kinds <strong>of</strong> arguments, according to Peter, namely syllogisms, induction,<br />

enthymems, and examples. He does not discuss syllogisms, but gives<br />

short examples <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r three. An induction is an argument from a particular<br />

proposition to a universal. An enthymem is an imperfect syllogism, like:<br />

91 William <strong>of</strong> Sherwood, Introduction to <strong>Logic</strong>, 69. This division is also explicit in Roger<br />

Bacon’s textbook. He also has a long discussion <strong>of</strong> demonstrative syllogisms, which is very<br />

interesting and seems influenced by Al-Ghazālī. He also discusses something he calls syllogismus<br />

falsigraphicus and also dialectical and sophistical syllogisms. All <strong>the</strong>se are, according to him,<br />

divisions according to <strong>the</strong> matter <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> syllogism. See Roger Bacon, Summulae Dialectices, III,<br />

207-20.

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