Handbook of the History of Logic: - Fordham University Faculty

90 Ian Wilks
standings of universal and singular . These are differentiated in that the
understanding pertaining to the universal name grasps a common and confused
image of many, but the understanding which the singular word generates grasps
a form which is proper to one and, as it were, singular — that is, related only to
one object (personam)” [Abelard, 1919, p. 21 (27–32)]. The image arising from
many, to which the understanding of a general term is referenced, is “common
and confused,” while the image arising from only one, to which the understanding
of a singular term is referenced, is not “common and confused.” The difference
in signification between singular and general terms is therefore a matter of the
presence or absence of confusion in imaging.
Confusion in imaging just involves leaving out details of what is imaged. This
omission is a cognitive limitation of sorts, but one which serves a purpose in that
it allows the image to be variously applicable to differing objects — so long as
the details it leaves out are the ones that constitute differences between them.
Abelard takes for his example the image of the lion, which may be so specified
as to mark out the fact that it is limping, having been wounded by the spear of
Hercules; or it may lack such distinguishing marks [Abelard, 1919, p. 22 (18–22)].
When lacking such marks, the image is more confused, but capable of conferring
upon a term a more general range of application. When retaining such marks, the
image loses the confusion but also the general range. A general term, then, works
in this way: the understanding associated with it represents no member of the
species with individuating detail, and so achieves representation of all members.
Through this achievement it confers upon the term the ability to apply generally.
Here, then, is Abelard’s way of obviating reference to shared forms in accounting
for the meaningfulness of general terms:
Hence, when I hear “man” a certain figure (instar) arisesinmysoul
which is related to single men in such a way as to be common to
all and proper to none. But when I hear “Socrates” a certain form
arises in my soul which expresses a likeness of a certain person. Hence,
through this word “Socrates,” which presses upon the soul the proper
form of one , a certain thing is indicated and determined; but
through “man,” the understanding of which rests on a form common
to all , the commonness itself stems from the confusion , so that we should not understand any one out of all
of them [Abelard, 1919, pp. 21 (32)–22 (2)]. 15
“Form” and “figure” mean the same as “image” in this context. General terms
are thus terms which arise from failure to image completely. This failure, however,
is a matter of being partial as opposed to complete in their representation, and
not a matter of being misleading as opposed to accurate. Neither “Socrates” nor
“man” is a misleading term, but the latter is more partially representative than the
15 “Thing” in this citation translates res. For the meaning of this Latin term — so central for
semantic theory at this time — see [Jolivet, 1975, pp. 538–543], [Jolivet, 1982, p. 293, note 248]
and [Kretzmann, 1982, p. 497].