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Handbook of the History of Logic: - Fordham University Faculty

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The Development <strong>of</strong> Supposition Theory in <strong>the</strong> Later 12 th through 14 th Centuries 245<br />

Every donkey is this mammal<br />

you may infer <strong>the</strong> original proposition:<br />

Every donkey is a mammal.<br />

In illustrating <strong>the</strong> definitions above we showed that <strong>the</strong> subjects <strong>of</strong> affirmative<br />

propositions and <strong>the</strong> predicate <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> universal affirmative have <strong>the</strong> modes that<br />

<strong>the</strong>y were assigned throughout <strong>the</strong> tradition. All <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r terms in <strong>the</strong> standard<br />

categorical propositions are like this. For example, we can show that by <strong>the</strong>se<br />

definitions <strong>the</strong> predicate term <strong>of</strong> a particular negative proposition has distributive<br />

supposition:<br />

The term ‘donkey’ has distributive supposition in ‘Some stone is not a donkey’<br />

because<br />

Descent: You may descend under ‘donkey’ to a conjunction <strong>of</strong> instances<br />

<strong>of</strong> all donkeys. That is, from:<br />

Some stone is not a donkey<br />

you may infer:<br />

Some stone is not this donkey and some stone is not that<br />

donkey and ...and so on for all <strong>the</strong> donkeys.<br />

Ascent: You may not ascend back to <strong>the</strong> original proposition; from<br />

an instance <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> form:<br />

Some stone is not this donkey<br />

you may not infer <strong>the</strong> original proposition:<br />

Some stone is not a donkey.<br />

The earlier and later <strong>the</strong>ories agree on <strong>the</strong> terms <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> standard Aristotelian<br />

categorical propositions, but <strong>the</strong>y disagree in many o<strong>the</strong>r cases. Consider <strong>the</strong><br />

proposition<br />

Not every man is running<br />

The subject <strong>of</strong> this proposition was taken to have distributive supposition by<br />

Sherwood. This is presumably because <strong>the</strong> proposition is got by putting ‘not’ in<br />

front <strong>of</strong> a universal affirmative proposition, in which ‘man’ is already distributed.<br />

But on <strong>the</strong> later <strong>the</strong>ory <strong>the</strong> mode <strong>of</strong> supposition changes when <strong>the</strong> ‘not’ is put<br />

on. It is easy to check that according to <strong>the</strong> later <strong>the</strong>ory <strong>of</strong> ascent and descent<br />

<strong>the</strong> term ‘man’ in‘not every man is running’ has determinate supposition. This<br />

is because from<br />

Not every man is running

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