Handbook of the History of Logic: - Fordham University Faculty

The Development of Supposition Theory in the Later 12 th through 14 th Centuries 199
Variety 1 of Simple Supposition
The simplest sort of simple supposition is given by the standard example:
Man is a species
As quoted above, Lambert describes this as a case in which a term has no relation
at all to “the supposita”; that is, to the things that fall under the form that is
signified. William similarly describes this kind of simple supposition as a case in
which
[A] a word is posited “without any connection with things”. [IL V.7
(111)]
In either case this is pretty straightforward: the utterance is treated just as if the
term were a noun standing for the form that it signifies. 51
Conceptualist alternatives are predictable: in this variety of simple supposition,
the word stands for the concept it signifies, either because that concept is the form,
or because there are no forms, but only concepts.
Simple supposition occurs when a term supposits for an intention of
the soul and is not functioning significatively. For example, in ‘Man is
a species’ the term ‘man’ supposits for an intention of the soul, for it
is that intention that is a species. [SL, 1.64 (190)]
Other varieties of simple supposition are more complex, and require additional
discussion. Lambert describes the other cases as ones in which there is a relation
to the supposita, “not determinately, but indeterminately”[PT 3g(ii)]. William
divides these into two types, and I’ll follow his classification. The examples that
fall under these two additional types were discussed by several authors.
Variety 2 of Simple Supposition
The second variety of simple supposition occurs when
[a word is posited] for the significatum connected with things insofar
as it is actually preserved in every single thing, and is predicable of it
[Sherwood IL V.7.2 (111)]
The standard example which gives rise to this kind of simple supposition is:
Man is the noblest of creatures
51 In a very early anonymous writing (Cum sit nostra) the author maintains that in a proposition
like ‘Man is a species’ theword‘man’ is not a common term at all, but rather a discrete
name (like a proper name) of the species; this view is attributed to the grammarian Priscian.
So it is not a common term used simply. This leaves unaddressed the question of what kind of
supposition it has, but it appears that it may have personal supposition here — since the word
apparently supposits for what it names, not for what it signifies.