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Handbook of the History of Logic: - Fordham University Faculty

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<strong>Logic</strong> and Theories <strong>of</strong> Meaning . . . 379<br />

level <strong>of</strong> cognition intention concrete abstract<br />

apprehension first man<br />

humanity<br />

(according to his<br />

proper mode <strong>of</strong> being)<br />

second universal, genus, universality, general-<br />

species, differentia ity etc.<br />

composition first man is an animal reflection on this<br />

second conclusion, propo-<br />

composition<br />

this composition as<br />

sition, question far as it is concluded,<br />

affirmed/denied<br />

doubted<br />

or<br />

reasoning first every man runs, reflection on this rea-<br />

Socrates is a man, soning, e.g. that it is<br />

<strong>the</strong>refore<br />

runs<br />

Socrates deductive reasoning<br />

second syllogism, enthymeme,inference,<br />

deduction<br />

<strong>of</strong> abstraction results in <strong>the</strong> concept and first abstract intention humanity. In<br />

Aquinas’ terms this would be called formal or precisive abstraction. It is obvious<br />

that ‘humanity’ cannot be predicated <strong>of</strong> John. Only concrete intentions can be<br />

predicated, but it is not <strong>the</strong> intention man that is predicated, because John is not a<br />

concept, but <strong>the</strong> real man under <strong>the</strong> aspect <strong>of</strong> humanity (sub ratione humanitatis).<br />

The predication implies a description that corresponds with <strong>the</strong> mode <strong>of</strong> being <strong>of</strong><br />

<strong>the</strong> object. 165<br />

Radulphus pays ample attention to <strong>the</strong> question <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> origin and foundation <strong>of</strong><br />

second intentions. 166 On <strong>the</strong> level <strong>of</strong> apprehension <strong>the</strong> foundation <strong>of</strong> a cognition <strong>of</strong><br />

second intention (e.g. when species is predicated <strong>of</strong> man) is <strong>the</strong> same as that <strong>of</strong> a<br />

cognition <strong>of</strong> first intention (e.g. when animal is predicated <strong>of</strong> man), namely a real<br />

man; only <strong>the</strong> mode <strong>of</strong> being under which <strong>the</strong> object is known is different. 167 Thus,<br />

second intentions on <strong>the</strong> level <strong>of</strong> apprehension are caused by a real object under a<br />

common mode <strong>of</strong> being (sub modo essendi communi). Radulphus concludes that<br />

<strong>the</strong>se second intentions are real (but <strong>of</strong> course not extra-mental) habits <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />

intellect. 168 <strong>Logic</strong> considers things according to <strong>the</strong>ir (common) modes <strong>of</strong> being<br />

165Pinborg [1974, p. 53].<br />

166Radulphus Brito, soph. ‘Aliquis homo est species’, paragraph 52–59. See also Pinborg [1974,<br />

pp. 53–4].<br />

167Pinborg [1974, p. 53].<br />

168paragraph 56, [ed. Pinborg, p. 146].

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