Handbook of the History of Logic: - Fordham University Faculty

28 John Marenbon
possibility that they were written in the same period as this work and not much
earlier in his career.
Martianus divides his exposition roughly equally between a presentation of the
material of the Isagoge and the Categories, on the one hand, and of that of
On Interpretation and syllogistic (from Apuleius), on the other. Eriugena shows
the direction of his interest by writing about twice as much on the first half.
Moreover, the glosses on the second half show an intelligent grasp of the material,
but not the very individual perspectives he brings to the Isagoge and Categories.
Two moments are of particular interest. When Martianus discusses substance
[Martianus Capella, 1983, 117:5], Eriugena writes
He is speaking about substance which is essence, that is hypostasis, not
usia, because usia is beyond all the Categories and does not receive any
accident. Then it descends to substance, that is to hypostasis; then
it receives accidents and has the first place in the Categories. [John
Scottus Eriugena, 1939, 95:1-4; Von Perger, 2005, no. 82]
The word ‘usia’ (i.e. the Greek ousia) is not found in Martianus, but is the regular
term in the Ten Categories. But Eriugena uses it to make a distinction not found
in that work, nor indeed anywhere else in the tradition. Eriugena seems to be
thinking, just as he does in the Periphyseon, that there is some universal being,
distinct from the individual beings that receive accidents (such as Socrates and
Fido), from which particular things gain their existence. An earlier gloss [John
Scottus Eriugena, 1939, 84:10-17; Von Perger, 2005, nos. 68, 80] had already,
in line with the theory Eriugena develops in his major work, spoken of ‘essence
that comprehends all nature, by the participation in which eveything that exists
subsists and which is called the most general genus.’
Eriugena also develops a theory about qualities which takes them, not as Aristotelian
accidental forms, but as Platonic Ideas. Glossing the lemma ‘Qualities
can receive through the substances’ [Martianus Capella, 1983,
121:15-16] he explains:
that is, in the substances themselves, as if he were to say: when, in the
soul, you consider a notion of quality, because it is one and perfect, the
quality does not receive in itself more and less. Similarly, if you consider
the individual substance, I say that, because it is perfect and individual
in itself it does not receive more and less. But if the
participation of quality through substances, you will find more and
less. For there can be a certain substance that participates the same
quality more than another. (. . . )[John Scottus Eriugena, 1939, 97:34
— 98:4; Von Perger, 2005, no. 93]
In the case of human beings, Eriugena suggests [John Scottus Eriugena, 1939,
97:25-33; Von Perger, 2005, no. 92], imperfect participation should be seen in
terms of ‘reaching after’: a just or learned person really is perfectly just, and so
justice and learning in this case do not receive more or less. But a person can