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Handbook of the History of Logic: - Fordham University Faculty

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290 Henrik Lagerlund<br />

He notes fur<strong>the</strong>r that in none <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>se figures does a conclusion follow from only<br />

negative premises, from only particular premises, and from a combination <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />

major negative and <strong>the</strong> minor particular. 24 The first figure is different from <strong>the</strong><br />

o<strong>the</strong>r two in primarily two ways: first <strong>of</strong> all, <strong>the</strong> syllogisms in it are not reduced to<br />

any o<strong>the</strong>r syllogisms, and <strong>the</strong> conclusions in it are <strong>of</strong> four different kinds, namely<br />

universal affirmative, universal negative, particular affirmative, and particular negative.<br />

In <strong>the</strong> second figure <strong>the</strong>re are no affirmative conclusions and in <strong>the</strong> third<br />

figure <strong>the</strong>re are no universal conclusions. 25<br />

As Aristotle himself had maintained <strong>the</strong> first figure is perfect. He, however, says<br />

very little about why it is perfect. Al-Ghazālī want to explain this by showing why<br />

<strong>the</strong> first figure syllogisms are “certain”, as he says. He says that “when you posit<br />

a true affirmative proposition, <strong>the</strong>n whatever is said about all <strong>of</strong> its predicate <strong>the</strong><br />

same thing is said about its subject.” 26 In a true proposition like ‘A human being<br />

is an animal’ one must think that <strong>the</strong> subject includes all <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> predicate. He<br />

thus assumes some kind <strong>of</strong> inclusive relation between <strong>the</strong> subject and <strong>the</strong> predicate<br />

and this accounts for <strong>the</strong> certainty <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> first figure syllogisms. 27 This becomes<br />

more clear when one has a look at how he presents <strong>the</strong> four valid syllogisms. He<br />

namely presents <strong>the</strong>m with <strong>the</strong> minor premise first, since he wants to highlight <strong>the</strong><br />

inclusion relation between <strong>the</strong> terms. The examples he gives <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> four syllogisms<br />

are:<br />

(3.1.13) ‘Every body is a composite, but every composite began, <strong>the</strong>refore<br />

every body began.’<br />

(3.1.14) ‘Every body is a composite, but no composite is eternal, <strong>the</strong>refore<br />

no body is eternal.’<br />

(3.1.15) ‘Some thing is a composite, but every composite began, <strong>the</strong>refore<br />

some thing began.’<br />

(3.1.16) ‘Some thing is a composite, but no composite is eternal, <strong>the</strong>refore<br />

some thing is not eternal.’ 28<br />

The first thing to notice is <strong>of</strong> course that each syllogism is lined up as a conditional<br />

with <strong>the</strong> minor premise first. Putting <strong>the</strong> premises in this order lines up <strong>the</strong><br />

terms nicely as minor, middle and major. In <strong>the</strong> first figure, ‘body’ includes<br />

‘composite’ and ‘composite’ in turn includes ‘began’, which makes it obvious that<br />

‘body’ includes ‘began’ as well. The quantification <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> propositions is just<br />

expressing how many <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> subjects have <strong>the</strong> predicates. In (3.1.13), all have.<br />

In <strong>the</strong> second figure, Al-Ghazālī presents <strong>the</strong> following valid syllogisms:<br />

(3.1.17) ‘Every body is divisible, but no animal is divisible, <strong>the</strong>refore<br />

no body is an animal.’<br />

24Al-Ghazālī, Tractatus de logica, 260, 61-3.<br />

25Al-Ghazālī, Tractatus de logica, 260, 64-70.<br />

26Al-Ghazālī, Tractatus de logica, 260, 76-8.<br />

27This was called taking <strong>the</strong> terms universally in Latin logic. See <strong>the</strong> discussion about this<br />

below.<br />

28Al-Ghazālī, Tractatus de logica, 261, 88-110.

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