22.06.2013 Views

Handbook of the History of Logic: - Fordham University Faculty

Handbook of the History of Logic: - Fordham University Faculty

Handbook of the History of Logic: - Fordham University Faculty

SHOW MORE
SHOW LESS

Create successful ePaper yourself

Turn your PDF publications into a flip-book with our unique Google optimized e-Paper software.

262 Terence Parsons<br />

to formulate a proposition containing a term that works this way, using only <strong>the</strong><br />

terminology we have at our disposal. 125<br />

Paul <strong>of</strong> Venice in LM divides distributive supposition into mobile and immobile.<br />

His account <strong>of</strong> mobile supposition is interestingly different from earlier accounts.<br />

He says that a term has mobile distributive supposition in a proposition if one may<br />

descend under a term to a conjunction <strong>of</strong> instances <strong>of</strong> that proposition, and one<br />

may also ascend — not from a single instance – but from <strong>the</strong> whole conjunction. 126<br />

It is easy to check that <strong>the</strong> subjects <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> standard universal propositions have this<br />

kind <strong>of</strong> supposition, as well as <strong>the</strong> predicate <strong>of</strong> a universal negative proposition.<br />

But <strong>the</strong> predicate <strong>of</strong> a particular negative proposition does not have this kind <strong>of</strong><br />

supposition, since you cannot go from<br />

to<br />

Some A is not this B and some A is not that B and ...and so on for<br />

all <strong>the</strong> Bs.<br />

SomeAisnotaB.<br />

It is odd for him to call this “immobile” supposition, because one can descend<br />

under <strong>the</strong> predicate term <strong>of</strong> a particular negative to any instance. Perhaps he sees<br />

mobility as requiring a valid inference in both directions. We will return to his<br />

particular kind <strong>of</strong> supposition in a later section. Meanwhile it appears that <strong>the</strong>re<br />

was a practical consensus on <strong>the</strong> account <strong>of</strong> distributive supposition simpliciter.<br />

8.9.3 Merely Confused Supposition<br />

We have been using this definition:<br />

A term F has merely confused supposition in a proposition P if and<br />

only if<br />

[Descent]: you may not descend under F to ei<strong>the</strong>r a conjunction<br />

or a disjunction <strong>of</strong> propositional instances <strong>of</strong> all <strong>the</strong> F s,<br />

and<br />

[Ascent]: from any instance you may ascend back to <strong>the</strong><br />

original proposition P .<br />

This mode shows <strong>the</strong> most variation in how it is characterized. I’ll look at two<br />

options. The first is <strong>the</strong> most famous one, devised by Ockham, which invokes<br />

125 Spade [1988] argues this, giving a clear explanation <strong>of</strong> what is at issue. (Trivial counterexamples<br />

to <strong>the</strong> claim are ruled out by <strong>the</strong> policy <strong>of</strong> ignoring <strong>the</strong> effect <strong>of</strong> repeated terms in<br />

testing for mode <strong>of</strong> supposition.)<br />

126 Paul <strong>of</strong> Venice LM 3.11a (89-121): “Distributive general reference is tw<strong>of</strong>old because some is<br />

mobile, some immobile. Distributive mobile general reference is <strong>the</strong> meaning <strong>of</strong> a common term<br />

beneath which one can infer to all <strong>of</strong> its singulars conjunctively on <strong>the</strong> condition <strong>of</strong> a proper<br />

middle and, conversely, with <strong>the</strong> same middle.”

Hooray! Your file is uploaded and ready to be published.

Saved successfully!

Ooh no, something went wrong!