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Handbook of the History of Logic: - Fordham University Faculty

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294 Henrik Lagerlund<br />

These five different levels <strong>of</strong> propositions are <strong>the</strong>n fur<strong>the</strong>r subdivided into all in<br />

all thirteen different kinds <strong>of</strong> propositions. The division is <strong>the</strong> following:<br />

(3.1.27) Demonstrative propositions;<br />

(i) Per se necessary propositions (primae);<br />

(ii) Propositions about sense perceptions (sensibiles);<br />

(iii) Experimental propositions (experimentales);<br />

(iv) Reputable propositions (famosae);<br />

(v) Intuitive propositions.<br />

(3.1.28) Topical propositions;<br />

(i) Maximal propositions (maximae);<br />

(ii) Granted propositions (concessae).<br />

(3.1.29) Rhetorical and legal propositions;<br />

(i) Propositions reporting received opinions (receptibiles);<br />

(ii) Apparent maximal propositions (maximae in apparentia);<br />

(iii) Believable propositions (putabiles).<br />

(3.1.30) Sophistical propositions;<br />

(i) Believable propositions;<br />

(ii) Deceptive propositions (simulatoriae).<br />

(3.1.31) Poetical propositions;<br />

(i) Imaginative or transformative propositions (imaginative sive transformativae).<br />

The thirteenth kind <strong>of</strong> proposition which does not fit into <strong>the</strong> classification above,<br />

but which he none<strong>the</strong>less outlines is called estimative propositions. He explains<br />

that <strong>the</strong>se are false propositions which somehow have been fixed in our souls and<br />

which we cannot doubt. Some <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> examples he gives are: ‘That which has no<br />

parts cannot be anything’, ‘Nothing is that which is not in <strong>the</strong> world and not<br />

outside it’, or ‘The totality <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> world terminates in a void or in a plenary’.<br />

The first five under (3.1.27) are all true propositions and as such <strong>the</strong>y are all<br />

<strong>the</strong> subject <strong>of</strong> demonstrative syllogisms or demonstrative science. The first kinds<br />

are per se necessary and naturally believed by <strong>the</strong> intellect. An example he gives<br />

is: ‘Two are more than one’. These are truths <strong>of</strong> reason, that is, truths <strong>the</strong><br />

intellect realizes without any training and education. The second kinds are simple<br />

truths based on perception, like ‘<strong>the</strong> sun is shining’. Next are <strong>the</strong> experimental<br />

propositions. While <strong>the</strong> first was purely based on <strong>the</strong> intellect and <strong>the</strong> second only<br />

on <strong>the</strong> senses, <strong>the</strong>se propositions are based on both. An example would be ‘Fire<br />

ignites’. Reputable (famosae) propositions are such propositions which nobody<br />

doubt, but where <strong>the</strong> foundation for <strong>the</strong>ir truth is now known. His example is:<br />

‘Egypt exists’, although no one has actually been <strong>the</strong>re to look. The last kinds<br />

<strong>of</strong> propositions usable in demonstration according to this classification at least

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