Handbook of the History of Logic: - Fordham University Faculty

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intellectus (concept/understanding)
vox (spoken word)
signification conception/likeness
res (extra-mental object)
Now, why is it that Aristotle speaks about the affections of the soul as likenesses
of things? Boethius’ answer is that the mind, when it understands, grasps not the
object itself, but an image, i.e. a likeness of the object. 11 The conception is,
as it were, affected by its object, the image of the thing, whereby it becomes
itself a likeness of the thing that is represented by the image. 12 In other words,
the intellectus is called an affection of the soul because it is affected, or rather
impressed, 13 by the image, so that eventually it bears a resemblance with the
thing in reality.
So far the most important points from Boethius’ commentary. His influence is
clear in Peter Abelard’s earlier works, but, more than Boethius, Abelard makes his
readers aware of the fact that, beside the concept, there is another candidate for
the role of primary significate of a spoken word: it is the extra-mental object itself.
In his view words signify things (res) as well as acts of the intellect (intellectus).
The intellectus is the primary significate of the spoken word, whereas the thing
in reality is the secondary significate. In reality, however, since something has to
exist before it can be known, the thing is prior to the concept, so that naturally
speaking the signification of the thing comes first. 14 The signification of things is
the subject of the Categoriae, whereas the signification of concepts is discussed in
the Peri hermeneias.
Abelard gives three reasons why the Peri hermeneias is about the relationship
between words and concepts rather than about the relationship between words
and things. First, in the Peri hermeneias Aristotle makes a distinction between
the parts of a proposition: the noun and the verb. Well, the difference between a
noun and a verb does not correspond with a distinction between different things in
reality. For example, the words ‘driver’ and ‘driving’ signify the same object under
different modes of conceiving (modi concipiendi). The second reason why the Peri
hermeneias is about the signification of concepts rather than about the signification
of things is that there are no things signified by a proposition. A proposition
consists of a noun and a verb, and in the understanding of this proposition the
understandings of the parts are united. Finally, things are transitory, whereas
concepts are permanent, in the sense that the constitution of a concept does not
depend upon the actual existence of the object. Thus, in forming a proposition
11 E.g. Boethius, op.cit., p. 35, lines 3-6.
12 Boethius, op.cit., p. 35, 6-8.
13 Boethius, op.cit., p. 34, 13-4.
14 Peter Abelard, Logica ingredientibus, 112,31 - 113,3.