Handbook of the History of Logic: - Fordham University Faculty

190 Terence Parsons
signify the same from person to person — unlike spoken and written words, which
change signification from one spoken language to another. So there is a single
mental language common to everyone. The words and propositions of written and
spoken language get their signification by being associated with words and propositions
of mental language. Mental propositions and concepts then play something
like the role played by abstract propositions and meanings today. In particular,
the truth value of a spoken or written proposition is determined by the truth value
of the mental proposition related to it:
Any sentence signifying by convention is true or false precisely because
there corresponds to it a true or false mental [sentence] properly so
called. [Peter of Ailly I II para 148 (46)]
This means that the analysis of truth above in terms of supposition must apply
fundamentally to mental propositions, and indirectly to spoken and written ones.
If mental language provides the fundamental ingredients for truth-bearing propositions,
it must contain the resources necessary for the job. Ockham suggested
that this is all that mental language contains. In order to discover the ingredients
of mental language, one need only determine what ingredients of natural
language can affect the truth of a proposition; mental language contains analogues
of these ingredients and nothing more. He concluded, for example, that in addition
to terms and a copula, mental propositions must also contain something analogous
to case and to number. Case is necessary because changing the case of a
word can change truth value: a change of case converts ‘SocratesNominative sees
PlatoAccusative’ to ‘SocratesAccusative sees PlatoNominative’ (meaning that Plato sees
Socrates). Similarly for number: ‘[A] man is [an] animal’ is true, though ‘[A]
man is [the] animals’ is false. So case and number occur in mental language. But
mental language does not contain anything corresponding to the various declensions,
because these do not affect truth conditions. Some synonyms differ only in
declension, so it appears that the declension is contributing nothing. It appears,
in fact, that there are to be no pairs of synonyms of any kind in mental language:
The multiplicity of synonymous expressions in no way enhances the
significative power of language; whatever is signified by an expression
is signified equally by its synonym. The point of the multiplicity at
work in the case of synonyms terms is the embellishment of speech or
something of that nature, so that the relevant multiplicity has no place
at the conceptual level. [Ockham SL 1.3 (52)]
3.5 Connotative Terms
Ockham divides terms into absolute and connotative. He characterizes connotative
terms as follows:
A connotative name, . . , is one that signifies one thing primarily and
another thing secondarily. Connotative names have what is, in the