Handbook of the History of Logic: - Fordham University Faculty

The Development of Supposition Theory in the Later 12 th through 14 th Centuries 193
One might naturally dispute the claim that the words have the same definitions
in the two cases, but one might also naturally accept this. After all, in order to
know which species is being referred to, all you need to understand is the word
with its normal definition. Is this a case in which a word is used in two different
ways but with the same definition in each case, or is it a case in which two different
but related definitions are appealed to? Writers took both sides of this issue. 43
Consider the realist picture; a meaningful categorematic word has a form that
it signifies, and it is commonly used to supposit for the things that fall under the
form. There are thus three things prominently associated with a term that it may
be used to supposit for: itself, its signified form, and the things falling under the
form.
Material supposition is the kind of supposition a word has when it supposits
for itself or for a related piece of language. An example is:
Donkey is bisyllabic
Here on the most natural interpretation ‘donkey’ is used with material supposition,
to supposit for tokens of the word itself.
Simple supposition is the sort appealed to in the proposition:
Donkey is a species
On the most natural interpretation of this proposition, ‘donkey’ is used with simple
supposition, to supposit for the form that it signifies; in this case for a species of
animal.
Personal supposition is the kind of supposition a word has when it is used
normally, for the things falling under the signified form. An example is:
Every donkey is running
On the most natural interpretation of this sentence, ‘donkey’ is used here with
personal supposition — to supposit for individual donkeys.
Writers point out that the terms ‘simple’, ‘material’ and ‘personal’ are technical
terms, whose meanings cannot be gleaned from their non-technical uses. For
Elizabeth Karger’s unpublished translation of Tractatus de Univocatione Monacensis, pp. 333-
51 of de Rijk II.2.) In About Univocation we read: “Univocation is [a caseof] the supposition
of a name having varied, the signification having remained the same. (Translation of a selection
from Fallacie Parvipontane, pp. 545-609 of De Rijk I. Bottom of second page of translation.)
For discussion of the historical origin of univocation, seeDeRijkLM II.I.XV.1 (492).
43 The author of About Univocation gives several arguments in favor of the view that univocation
should be grouped with equivocation. The author of the Treatise on Univocation explains
how univocation differs from equivocation: in equivocation there is a change in the signification
of a word, whereas in univocation the signification does not change; only the appellation (≈
the supposition) changes. Buridan SD 7.3.2 (516) classifies examples of univocation as cases of
equivocation; he defines equivocation in terms of a word in context having different significations,
and he holds that in ‘homo ambulat’ theword‘homo’ doeshavediversesignificationseven
though there is no new definition. This is because when ‘homo’ is used to stand for the species
it is subordinated to a different mental concept than when it is used to stand for persons.