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Handbook of the History of Logic: - Fordham University Faculty

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466 Catarina Dutilh Novaes<br />

2.2 O<strong>the</strong>r important developments<br />

2.2.1 The doctrine <strong>of</strong> pro<strong>of</strong> <strong>of</strong> terms/propositions<br />

Besides <strong>the</strong> ‘older’ semantic tradition based on <strong>the</strong> concept <strong>of</strong> supposition, ano<strong>the</strong>r<br />

semantic tradition became very influential in <strong>the</strong> 14 th century. 32 This tradition<br />

was known as <strong>the</strong> doctrine <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> pro<strong>of</strong> <strong>of</strong> terms (probationes terminorum) or<br />

propositions, and its most influential text was Billingham’s Speculum Puerorum.<br />

Billingham’s text was not <strong>the</strong> first in this tradition (for example, de Rijk dates<br />

Martin <strong>of</strong> Alnwick’s text also edited in [De Rijk, 1982] as earlier than Billigham’s),<br />

but it seems to have been <strong>the</strong> main source for <strong>the</strong> popularity <strong>of</strong> this genre in <strong>the</strong><br />

second part <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> 14 th century.<br />

‘Pro<strong>of</strong>’ here is not to be understood in its ma<strong>the</strong>matical/logical sense, as demonstration;<br />

in this sense, to prove a proposition is to show what its truth depends on,<br />

in particular which simpler propositions must be true in order for a given proposition<br />

to be true. It is essentially an analytic procedure, in which <strong>the</strong> meaning<br />

<strong>of</strong> a ‘difficult’ proposition is decomposed in terms <strong>of</strong> simpler propositions, known<br />

as immediate propositions, on <strong>the</strong> basis <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> analysis <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> term(s) causing <strong>the</strong><br />

proposition to be a ‘difficult’ one. Immediate propositions are those, according<br />

to Billingham, which cannot be proved (verified) except by a direct appeal to<br />

<strong>the</strong> senses or <strong>the</strong> understanding. These would be primarily propositions with directly<br />

referential pronouns or adverbs such as ‘I’, ‘this’, ‘that’, ‘here’, ‘now’ etc (cf.<br />

Billigham, Probationes Terminorum, in [De Rijk, 1982, 49]).<br />

There are three basic techniques to ‘prove’ a proposition, according to whe<strong>the</strong>r<br />

<strong>the</strong> proposition is an exponible, a resoluble or an <strong>of</strong>ficiable proposition. An exponible<br />

proposition is one that corresponds to several propositions taken in conjunction,<br />

such as ‘Socrates begins to be white’, which corresponds to ‘Socrates was<br />

not white and Socrates is now white’. Propositions containing comparative and<br />

superlative terms, or <strong>the</strong> verbs ‘begins’, ‘ceases’ and ‘differs from’ are analyzed<br />

in this fashion. A resoluble proposition is one that involves <strong>the</strong> descent from a<br />

general term to discrete terms, such as ‘A man is running’, which is proved by an<br />

appeal to sense experience codified by <strong>the</strong> propositions ‘This is a man’ and ‘This<br />

is running’. Finally, an <strong>of</strong>ficiable proposition is one containing <strong>the</strong> nominalization<br />

<strong>of</strong> a proposition with <strong>the</strong> accusative-plus-infinitive construction, and corresponds<br />

roughly to what is now known as ‘opaque contexts’ (modalities and verbs related<br />

to propositional attitudes such as ‘think’, ‘believe’ etc.).<br />

Although we dispose <strong>of</strong> several texts presenting <strong>the</strong> doctrine <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> pro<strong>of</strong> <strong>of</strong><br />

propositions/terms, it is still in fact quite understudied. Indeed, it is fair to say<br />

that we still do not really understand <strong>the</strong> purpose and <strong>the</strong> mechanisms defining it<br />

(see [Spade, 2000, part IV]). For this reason, it is to be hoped that scholars will<br />

at some point take up <strong>the</strong> challenge <strong>of</strong> analyzing this doctrine systematically, as<br />

32 This approach was sometimes used instead <strong>of</strong> supposition <strong>the</strong>ories (cf. Johannes Venator’s<br />

<strong>Logic</strong>a which uses <strong>the</strong> doctrine <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> pro<strong>of</strong> <strong>of</strong> propositions exclusively), but at o<strong>the</strong>r times both<br />

<strong>the</strong>ories co-existed toge<strong>the</strong>r, for example as distinct chapters <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> same work (such as Paul <strong>of</strong><br />

Venice’s <strong>Logic</strong>a Parva).

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