Body and Soul in Ancient Philosophy

90
Anthony A. Long
ratios attributed to him by the later tradition, Heraclitus should, it
would seem, have counted him an important ally in his own pursuit
of rationality and cosmic harmony. Thus Kahn (1979, 204) suggests
that Heraclitus’ conception of cosmic order in terms of logos and harmoniÞ
should be seen as a generalization of the Pythagorean notion of musical
ratios. Maybe so. But I find this suggestion hard to reconcile with
Heraclitus’ polemic against Pythagoras as “the prince of swindlers” (B
81).
It is tempting, on the other hand, to think that Anaximander escaped
Heraclitus’ censure precisely because the latter sympathized with
some of his Milesian predecessor’s ideas. The two thinkers shared an interest
in measurement, balance, and cosmic justice. 5 All of these notions
are fundamental components of Heraclitean rationality. A complete
papyrus of Anaximander’s book might show us even greater lexical
and conceptual affinity to Heraclitus than we are able to state from
our meagre documentation. But one thing I very much doubt that it
would reveal is Anaximander’s interest in human psychology, ethics,
and politics. 6 We have every reason to suppose that Anaximander,
like his fellow Milesians, was primarily a cosmologist, albeit one
whose interests were broad enough to include the origins of life and
also geography. Heraclitus had the much more complex ambition of integrating
cosmology with (what we would call) ethics, psychology, epistemology
and politics. 7 It is that integration, so I think, that makes him
such a seminal figure for understanding the distinctive evolution of rationality
in subsequent Greek philosophy.
This observation brings me to the third dimension of my methodology.
Rather than working from Heraclitus’ own words or from his relation
to his predecessors, I want initially to study his idea of rationality
through what I take to be its afterlife. An obvious way to do that would
take us forward to the Stoics, who drew so much inspiration from re-
5 Should we detect an implicit criticism of Anaximander in B 80 where Heraclitus
identifies justice with strife? Hussey 1999, 110 n. 5, takes Heraclitus to be
making an implicit “correction” of Anaximander here, but he also (89) thinks it
“may be significant that Heraclitus does not attack any of the Milesians by
name”.
6 For a very different view of Anaximander’s primary interests, see Naddaf 2005,
92 – 112, whose highly political interpretation of Anaximander is hardly
grounded in any firm evidence.
7 Hence, I take it, the doxographical claim (D.L. 9.5) that his discourse On nature
treated three subjects – the universe, politics, and theology.