Body and Soul in Ancient Philosophy

298
David Charles
3. Desire: A model for processes common to body and soul
Since anger is a type of desire (403a31), the general style of definition
which applies to it should also apply to other forms of desire. Indeed,
Aristotle begins this section of de An. I.1 by commenting that he is concerned
with an account for the affections (pathÞ) of the soul quite generally,
including sensual desire (epithymein) and perception as well as
anger and fear (403a5 – 7). Throughout the chapter he seems to be
working out a model in the case of anger, confidence and fear which
can apply to all (or most) of the affections of the soul mentioned at
the beginning of the section. (403b16 –19). It is particularly compelling
to see this model as applying to sensual desire (epithymia), which elsewhere
is counted as a passion of the same general type as anger, fear
and confidence (EN 1105b21 ff.).
If this is correct, we can derive the following general account of sensual
desire and how it moves the animal:
(1) Sensual desire, like anger, is an inextricably psycho-physical process
(perhaps essentially involving some heating of the blood).
(2) As a result of the heat provided by desire, there is a further inextricably
psycho-physical process in the part of the agent which corresponds
to the hinge joint: for this process too is common to the
body and the soul.
(3) As a result of this second process the limbs are moved in just the way
required for the action desired. The moving of the limbs will also be
an inextricably psycho-physical process (like weaving).
The simplicity of this picture should not obscure its distinctive features.
More specifically:
(1) It is not a dualist account in which a purely psychological phenomenon
results in the movement of the body. For desire, in Aristotle’s
account, is already a psycho-physical not a purely psychological
process. (Nor is it the account the spiritualist would offer. For, in
it, the body is not endowed with a capacity for a purely psychological
process: it is not ‘pregnant with conscious striving’.)
(2) Nor is it the account materialists would offer because it lacks the
two features they require. It does not have either the purely psychological
aspect which specifies what desire is (in non-material terms)
or the purely physical process (defined in purely physical terms)
which grounds (or underlies) the relevant desire. For sensual desir-