Body and Soul in Ancient Philosophy

382
Keimpe Algra
with them, whereas Plutarch’s interpretations and refutations invariably
give a different twist to Chrysippus’ words, making him say things he
does not say. The actual quotations show Chrysippus being very careful
in describing the way in which god accommodates evil: he gives the
archai of destruction (1049b); “the organization of the universe as a
whole proceeds in this way” (1050a); punishments “are dispensed according
to the reason of Zeus” (1050e); and vice “does come about
in accordance with the reason of nature” (1050f ). This seems to be
his way to safeguard that providence can accommodate (cosmic as
well as moral) evil, in the way described above, by fitting it into the
overall order of things, without implying that god is directly responsible
or that he even, in a theistic fashion, ‘sends’ individual evils. Yet Plutarch
consistently creates his contradictions by assuming that the latter
is the case and that god directly induces wars and vices, so that, despite
the Stoic stress on his goodness, his deeds can be labeled ‘harsh, barbarous
and Galatian’ and god himself compared to the Galatian Deiotarus
(1049c). In particular it appears to be his strict conception of Stoic monism
that induces Plutarch to believe that god is himself responsible for all
these evils. This view may also have coloured his interpretation of the
fragment from the On Substance.
This brings me to my third point. In his interpretation of the Chrysippean
fragment Plutarch appears to give a rather tendentious interpretation
of the words di± t¹ jah_stashai 1p· t_m toio}tym dail|mia
vaOka. These words probably simply mean ‘because base spirits are in
attandance over/oversee these things’. Yet Plutarch either takes the
verb jah_stashai in a passive sense, meaning ‘are being appointed
[i.e. by god]’ or assumes that such an act on god’s part is at least implied,
and he uses this interpretation to attack Chrysippus. If this is the case, he
alleges, ‘how can this be anything but an accusation of god as of a king
who has entrusted provinces to evil and demented governors and generals
and pays no attention to their neglect and abuse of the most virtuous
men?’ (1051d). This, however, is merely an inference on Plutarch’s
part. It may well be due in part to the general context of his polemics, to
which I just referred – which, as we noted, assumes that the Stoic god,
qua providence, is directly responsible for everything, including evil. It
may also be due in part to the Platonic conception of demons as mediators
between gods and men with which Plutarch himself may have
been more familiar. 66 Yet, there is no reason to believe that Chrysippus
66 See e.g. Plutarch, Def. Or. 416 e–f: “Those who refuse to leave us the race of