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Body and Soul in Ancient Philosophy

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Stoic souls <strong>in</strong> Stoic corpses 1<br />

Tad Brennan<br />

What did the Stoics th<strong>in</strong>k about the relation between soul <strong>and</strong> body?<br />

What did they th<strong>in</strong>k about the relation between any particular <strong>in</strong>dividual,<br />

e.g. you or I or Socrates, <strong>and</strong> the souls <strong>and</strong> bodies that <strong>in</strong> some sense<br />

belong to us? Did they th<strong>in</strong>k that you <strong>and</strong> I <strong>and</strong> Socrates are simply<br />

bodies? Simply souls? Did they th<strong>in</strong>k that we are a comb<strong>in</strong>ation of<br />

body <strong>and</strong> soul? Or did they have some more complicated view?<br />

The texts that would have directly answered these questions are unfortunately<br />

lost. Few relevant scraps rema<strong>in</strong>, <strong>and</strong> those are not obviously<br />

consistent. So <strong>in</strong> this paper, I try to employ an <strong>in</strong>direct strategy: I try to<br />

<strong>in</strong>fer the answers to our questions about anthropology <strong>and</strong> metaphysics<br />

from Stoic views about ethics <strong>and</strong> the f<strong>in</strong>al end.<br />

Here’s the thought: when the Stoics (or any other ancient school)<br />

<strong>in</strong>struct you to pursue some telos or end, they do so as part of an account<br />

of what is good for you. But an account of what is good for you – for<br />

you, rather than the cosmos or a community or a cow – must <strong>in</strong>volve an<br />

account of what you, <strong>in</strong> fact, are. To put it somewhat awkwardly, you<br />

are the th<strong>in</strong>g for which the th<strong>in</strong>gs-that-are-good-for-you, are good. If<br />

we can figure out how to characterize the beneficiary of these benefits<br />

– what is the ‘you’ for whom these th<strong>in</strong>gs are good – then we can figure<br />

out what you are. And then the nature of the goods, <strong>and</strong> the way <strong>in</strong><br />

which they are good for you, may give us further detail about what exactly<br />

you are. So by start<strong>in</strong>g from ethical evidence, we may be able to<br />

1 This is a revised version of a talk that I gave at the Zweiter Kongress der Gesellschaft<br />

für antike Philosophie <strong>in</strong> Hamburg, Germany <strong>in</strong> 2007. I am grateful to<br />

Dorothea Frede for her organization of the event <strong>and</strong> for the <strong>in</strong>vitation to speak<br />

there. This paper <strong>in</strong>corporates <strong>and</strong> extends a l<strong>in</strong>e of thought I began <strong>in</strong> my book<br />

The Stoic Life (2005), particularly chapter 8, <strong>and</strong> arrives at a determ<strong>in</strong>ate conclusion<br />

concern<strong>in</strong>g some issues I left unresolved there. I received useful comments<br />

from members of the Hamburg audience, particularly Tony Long, Brad Inwood,<br />

Keimpe Algra, Brad Inwood, Chris Gill, <strong>and</strong> Jula Wildberg. My revisions<br />

benefited from the advice of Charles Britta<strong>in</strong> <strong>and</strong> Jacob Kle<strong>in</strong>. And as always,<br />

my deepest thanks go to Liz Karns.

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