Body and Soul in Ancient Philosophy

Stoics on souls and demons: Reconstructing Stoic demonology 381
demon that is at work? 65 We should note, in addition, that there are
several reasons to doubt the reliability of Plutarch’s interpretation of
the general tenor of this fragment.
First of all, the quotation provided by Plutarch is put in the form of a
question. This means that Chrysippus here introduces the workings of
bad demons – however they should be interpreted – as a possible explanation
of some forms of evil, next to others (note that the quotation begins
with ‘whether’ or ‘perhaps’: p|teqom), and that we cannot say with
any confidence whether and to what extent he was himself positively
committed to this view. Plutarch seems to ignore this dialectical context
and it may be significant, anyway, that he was apparently unable to find
a more positive statement of the view at issue in Chrysippus’ works.
Secondly, the overall context does not inspire much confidence, for
it reveals a certain recurrent pattern in Plutarch’s dealing with Chrysippus’
words. In sections 32 –36 of The Stoic Self-Contradictions (St. rep.),
which precede our quotation, Plutarch shows himself having a tin
ear, or preferring to have a tin ear, for some subtleties in Chrysippus’
dealing with the problems of providence and the theodicy. Of course
these problems are difficult and I would not dare to claim that Chrysippus
or any other Stoic managed to tackle them successfully. Yet the
fragments which Plutarch quotes from Chrysippus do contain some
pointers as to the particular way in which the latter preferred to deal
diction, but it is hard to believe that Chrysippus would be willing to make such
a claim in any serious way, rather than as a stray remark – possibly a mere suggestion
to be rejected later – probably quoted out of context by Plutarch.
65 This possibility is at least left open both by Cherniss’ Loeb translation (“or is it
because base spirits have been appointed over matters of the sort in which there
really do occur instances of negligence that must in fact be reprehended”) and
by the translation of Long & Sedley 1987, 330 and 332 (“or is it because the sort
of matters, in which real or blameworthy cases of negligence occur have evil
spirits in attendance?”). These translations are more neutral than Babut’s in
not adding anything equivalent to the latter’s “qui seraient à l’origine”, and
they allow the possibility that the one ultimately to blame in these cases is
the demon who is in control, possibly because he fails to do what demons
should do, i.e. be protective. This appears to be the view of Zintzen 1976,
who in connection with the quotation from Chrysippus’ On Substance claims
that “Unordnung in der Welt scheint das Werk pflichtvergessener, böser Dämonen
zu sein, die ihre Aufsicht verkehren”. On this reading the good person –
and if we may transfer the example to the cosmic level: god – is supposed to
come out as free of blame anyway: in the case of the first example mentioned
by Chrysippus (the husk), because there is no question of blame at all; in the
second (evil demons) because the blame befalls the demons.