Body and Soul in Ancient Philosophy

296
David Charles
blood which is directed towards revenge. The only process at issue is:
boiling-of-blood-for-the-sake-of-revenge.
Three points may help to clarify Aristotle’s thought on this issue.
[1] In Physics II.2, Aristotle understands physical form (the type of form
the physicist studies) on the model of the snub: concavity in the nose
(194a5 –8). Here, he claims that one cannot define the form correctly
in terms of concavity, taken as the form of the nose. For to define
the type of concavity of which we speak we have to refer to concavity-in-the-nose.
The latter reference is required to render determinate
the type of concavity at issue. It might be described as the determinant
which specifies the determinate type of concavity which snubness is.
If anger and fear also instantiate physical forms, they (like the snub)
must be defined as forms-in-matter. If so, to make specific the type of
desire for revenge that is required one has to define it as a-boiling-ofthe-blood-type-of-desire-for-revenge.
Otherwise, one will not be
able to distinguish the type of desire for revenge which characterises
anger from the cold, calculating, desire for revenge of the aged, who
are not at angry. (See Rh. 1390a15 ff.)
[2] In de An. I.1, Aristotle introduces a dialectical definition of a house
as covering designed to prevent damage from wind and rain (403b4 –6).
But this does not yet mark out the type of covering a house is. Caves,
awnings, tents and well-arranged branches are all coverings which are
also designed to serve this purpose. What makes the relevant covering
a house is that it is one which is made from matter such as bricks and
wood. While there are other types of covering, a house is a specific
type of matter-involving covering. Here, as in the case of the snub,
being matter-involving functions as a determinant which specifies the
determinate type of covering a house.
[3] Aristotle compares various affections of the soul, including anger,
with weaving in de An. I.4, 408b11–13. This is an especially revealing
example. For it seems intuitively clear that one cannot define what
weaving is in purely psychological terms without reference to bodily
movements. Indeed, as before:
[A] The psychological features that are essential to weaving (intentionally
moving one’s body to achieve a given goal) are inseparable in
definition from the processes with physical properties to which
they belong. They are inextricably psycho-physical features.
[B] The psycho-physical features (specified in [A]) are essential to the
identity of the processes to which they belong: the processes to