Body and Soul in Ancient Philosophy

268
Christopher Shields
Here the implication seems to be that even by formulating this unfortunate
question we are already implicated in some sort of mistake, perhaps
some sort of category mistake. 2 Although the milder translation is
almost certainly closer to Aristotle’s intended meaning, neither translation
can be ruled out on narrowly philological grounds. For while the
milder version is more in keeping with both Aristotle’s own idiom
and the normal Greek of his day, 3 the stronger version is not without
parallel in the period. 4
However that may be, and whichever translation is to be preferred,
Aristotle’s reasoning in this famous passage is opaque. Textbook treatments
understand Aristotle to mean, roughly, that the question of
soul-body unity does not arise because the soul and body jointly form
some single entity, an actually existing substance which requires the participation
of two metaphysical factors, matter and form, or body and
soul, and neither of these is anything actual in its own right. 5 There
are not, then, two things, the body and the soul, whose principles of
unity may require investigation or clarification, but rather one thing,
wise excellent Latin translation of 1966 becomes unacceptably paraphrastic at
this point: Ideo non est opus quaerere, an anima et corpus unum [quid] faciant, quemadmodum
[nec opus est quaerere, an unum faciunt] cera et figura [in cera impresssa],
et gerantium cuiusque rei materia et id, cuius est materia, cum enim unum et ens multifariam
dicantur, sensu pincipali [unum et ens] est actus [non materia], brackets as
found.
2 This seems an implication embraced by Barnes 1971/1972: I discuss this issue
below in § IV.
3 In fact Aristotle only uses the exact phrase oq de? fgte?m in one other passage, at
GA 737a12. Although not quite parallel, this passage is instructive, since in it
Aristotle is not cautioning against an inquiry, but rather comparing the lack
of material residue of semen in the embryo to the vegetable rennet used for curdling
milk, which, he observes, effects a change but does not remain in the curdled
milk. His observation in this passage is then that one need not look for
the material to re-emerge after it has effected its change. Other relevant passages
include: APo. 48a29; Metaph. 1007a7– 9, 1045a35–7; Rh. 1393b3–6,
1418a14 – 16.
4 This seems the consistent use, for example, of Antiphon the Sophist. See Pendrick
2002.
5 Guthrie 1981, 284 provides an especially good illustration of what I am here
calling the ‘textbook treatment’ of Aristotle’s contention. In so speaking, I
do not mean to impugn this interpretation by representing it as superficial,
for Guthrie is certainly not that; rather, I mean to suggest that this is the sort
of interpretation which is so widely received that it tends to figure without
comment in standard introductions to Aristotle’s thought. I say a bit more
about Guthrie’s textbook treatment below in § II.