Body and Soul in Ancient Philosophy

274
Christopher Shields
cause of being for all things, and for living things being is life – and the soul
is also the cause and principle of life.
5sti d³ Bxuwµ toO f_mtor s~lator aQt_a ja· !qw^. taOta d³ pokkaw_r
k]cetai, blo_yr d’ B xuwµ jat± to»r diyqisl]mour tq|pour tqe?r aQt_a·
ja· c±q fhem B j_mgsir ja· ox 6meja ja· ¢rBoqs_a t_m 1lx}wym syl\tym
B xuwµ aQt_a. fti l³m owm¢roqs_a, d/kom· t¹ c±q aUtiom toO eWmai p÷sim B
oqs_a, t¹ d³ f/m to?rf_si t¹ eWma_ 1stim, aQt_a d³ ja· !qwµ to}tou B xuw^.
(de An. 415b8 – 14; cf. PA 467b12 – 25; Ph. 255a6 –10)
The second is that the soul as substance provides the identity conditions
of the entity whose soul it is. This Aristotle makes clear in Metaphysics
VII 17, a chapter to which the terse text of De anima II 1 is plainly indebted:
The substance of each thing, then, is this [the form], for this is the primary
cause of [each thing’s] being [F]. Since among things, not all are substances,
while as many as are substances exist in accordance with nature, i. e. are
constituted by nature, it would be this nature – which is not an element,
but a principle – that is substance.
oqs_a d³ 2j\stou l³m toOto (toOto c±q aUtiom pq_tom toO eWmai) –1pe· d’
5mia oqj oqs_ai t_m pqacl\tym, !kk’ fsai oqs_ai, jat± v}sim ja· v}sei
sumest^jasi, vame_g #m ja·avtg B v}sir oqs_a, F1stim oq stoiwe?om !kk’
!qw^. (Metaph. 1041b27 – 31)
Together these passages commit Aristotle to the view that the soul as a
substance is the source and cause of the compound entity’s being the
entity it is – the soul is, for instance, the cause and source of a human
being’s being a human being.
Already, then, the notions of source (archÞ) and cause (aition) commit
Aristotle to the priority of soul: it is the soul, he maintains, which confers
unity and identity on the entity whose soul it is. The further connection
with the soul’s being an entelecheia helps explain how the soul is
to be conceived in this regard. It is, Aristotle’s supposes, the soul’s being
a final cause which permits it to serve as a principle of actuality:
Actuality is prior in substance as well, first because things posterior in generation
are prior in form and in substance (e. g. adult to boy, and man to
seed; for the one has the form and the other does not), and because everything
that comes to be proceeds to a source (archÞ), that is, to an end (for
that for the sake of which is an archÞ, and generation is for the sake of
the end), and the actuality is an end and the potentiality acquired for the
sake of this.
)kk± lµm ja·oqs_ô ce, pq_tom l³m fti t± t0 cem]sei vsteqa t` eUdei ja· t0
oqs_ô pq|teqa (oXom !mµq paid¹r ja·%mhqypor sp]qlator· t¹ l³m c±qEdg
5wei t¹ eWdor t¹ d’ ou), ja· fti ûpam 1p’ !qwµm bad_fei t¹ cicm|lemom ja·