Body and Soul in Ancient Philosophy

278
Christopher Shields
namely Metaphysics V 11 and Categories 12. These forms include priority
in place, time, movement, power, arrangement, knowledge, account,
and nature, which Aristotle also calls priority simpliciter (Metaph.
1018b9–1019a28; Cat. 12). The suggestion thus lies near that the
forms of priority are not the same, with the result that the putative contradiction
dissolves.
Further, so far, at least, in the formulation of this putative contradiction,
there may also seem to be a conflation between the body, which is
the matter of the compound, and the compound itself. Of which the
soul is said to be the entelecheia? If we think the soul is prior to the compound
and not the body, then if it is predicated of the body, there will
be no looming contradiction, because there will be different relata involved
in the varying priority claims. In fact, however, this simple response
only postpones the issue. For Aristotle offers a still more finegrained
account of the priority of entelecheia in Metaphysics IX 8. Priority
in entelecheia admits of three types: definition, time, and being. This last
form of priority we may call ontological priority, about which Aristotle
says the following: “Some things are called prior and posterior in this
way, others in respect of nature and substance (ta de kata physin kai ousian),
namely, those which can be without other things, while those others
cannot be without them” (Metaph. 1019a1 –4).
This passage seems to state the following account of ontological priority:
20
• x is ontologically prior to y = df x can exist without y, but y cannot
exist without x.
So, the problem re-emerges. If the soul is the entelecheia of the body or
compound, or both, then it appears ontologically prior to them. If so,
then, given Aristotle’s gloss on ontological priority in terms of asymmetric
implication for existence, it will follow that the soul can exist without
the body or compound, while the body or compound cannot exist
without it. So much, however, flatly contradicts Aristotle’s express contention:
“Therefore, that the soul is not separable from the body … is
not unclear” (fti l³m owmoqj5stim B xuwµ wyqistµ toO s~lator … oqj
%dgkom; de An. 413a4 –5). Hence, again, we have a contradiction. (i) If
the soul is the entelecheia of the body (or the compound), then it is ontologically
prior to the body (or the compound). (ii) If the soul cannot
20 For an intricate and illuminating discussion of ontological dependence in the
Metaphysics, see Wedin 2000, esp. 50 – 54 and 159–162.