Body and Soul in Ancient Philosophy

368
Keimpe Algra
the same time that it is a separate, individuated substance, not just a continuous
part of god. As two separate substances our soul and god can interact,
but how this works at the physical level does not become quite
clear, except that we may presume that here, as elsewhere, it is cosmic
sympnoia which secures a form of sympatheia. 27 Marcus Aurelius presents
his god as being able to ‘see’, i. e. to be in touch with, the hÞgemonika of
the souls which come from him: “For only with his mind he touches
what flows and comes from him into these entities.” 28 And Plutarch
quotes Chrysippus as saying that “Zeus and Dion are benefitted by
each other, being wise, when one of them hits upon the movements
of the other.” 29 If we may take such passages at face value, they seem
to suggest that human souls are divine but also in a relevant sense independent.
It is precisely in view of this ‘independent’ or individuated status
of the soul that it can be said to be ‘up to it’ to adjust itself to the
rationality of the cosmic god. Here we stumble upon a problematic feature
of early Stoic thought. The fact that some things are ‘up to’ the rational
soul, certainly means that it can be held morally responsible for
them. One cannot blame fate or god. Yet, the question whether and
to what extent this independent status of the soul really involves causal
independence, in the sense that our thoughts and intentions are not determined
by fate, i. e. by god, did not get a clear and unambiguous answer.
On the one hand, Cleanthes’ Zeus Hymn claims that all things are
from god, except what the bad do in their folly. 30 On the other hand,
Chrysippus goes so far as to claim that everything, including our virtue
or lack of virtue, is determined by fate. 31 Yet, even the Chrysippean orthodoxy
appears to have left room for self-improvement through training,
32 so perhaps the blunt statement about our virtue being predetermined
by fate merely means that our intellectual and moral predispositions
are predetermined, but that how we use them is ‘up to us’. If this is
correct, it follows not only that the Stoic god is not morally responsible
for the dealings of souls (and, as we shall see, by extension: demons), but
27 On the relation between sympatheia and sympnoia, see Laurand 2005.
28 M.Ant. XII, 2: l|m\ c±q t`2aut` moeq` l|mym ûptetai t_m 1n 2autoO eQr
taOta 1qqugj|tym ja· !pyweteul]mym.
29 Plutarch Comm. not. 1076a (SVF III, 246): ¡veke?sha_ h’blo_yr rp’!kk^kym
t¹m D_a ja· t¹m D_oma, sovo»r emtar, ftam 6teqor hat]qou tucw\m, jimoul]mou.
(see also Comm. not. 1068 f, SVF III, 627).
30 Text in SVF I, 537, lines 11 – 13.
31 Quotation from the first book of the On Nature in Plutarch, St. rep. 1050a.
32 See on this question, and on the relevant evidence, Bobzien 1998, 290 – 301.