Body and Soul in Ancient Philosophy

The priority of soul in Aristotle’s De anima: Mistaking categories? 279
exist without the body (or the compound), then it is not ontologically
prior to the body (or the compound). Hence, the soul is and is not ontologically
prior to the body (or the compound). For this problem, it
will not matter which relata we choose.
It is perhaps worth noting at this juncture that this problem, or
seeming problem, is really just the flip-side of Ackrill’s important problem
about the homonymy of the body. 21 That problem, in my formulation,
follows from just two theses:
• A General Principle of Hylomorphism: If m is the matter of a compound
c, and f its form, then m is contingently enformed by f.
• The Homonymy of the Body: A body which has lost its soul is not a
body, “except homonymously” (de An. 412b10–27).
With those theses, we can generate an apparent contradiction:
1. If m is the matter of a compound c, and f its form, then m is contingently
enformed by f (The General Principle of Hylomorphism).
2. A living being is a compound of form and matter: the body is the
matter and the soul is the form (de An. 412a19 –22).
3. Hence, in a living being, the body is contingently enformed by the
soul (1, 2).
4. A living body which has lost its soul is not a body, except homonymously
(de An. 412b10–27).
5. If (4), then the living body is not contingently enformed by the soul.
6. Hence, in a living being, the body is not contingently enformed by
the soul (4, 5).
7. Hence, in a living being, the body both is and is not contingently
enformed by the soul (3, 6).
Ackrill is surely right that there is a prima facie problem here for Aristotle.
What has not always been appreciated is that this problem is really just a
consequence of the priority of the soul. For its key premise, (4) that a
living body which has lost its soul is not a body except homonymously,
is a straightforward consequence of Aristotle’s commitment to the priority
of soul over the body. Indeed, one would be hard-pressed to understand
why Aristotle would insist on such a claim were it not for his
antecedent commitment to that priority.
If we merge these problems, we see their joint source. Given the
ontological priority of actuality, the soul is existentially independent
21 Ackrill 1972/1973, 119–133.