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Body and Soul in Ancient Philosophy

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Aristotle on desire <strong>and</strong> action 307<br />

on occasion, allows himself to talk of the soul as caus<strong>in</strong>g certa<strong>in</strong> changes<br />

(th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g, movements) he is quick to avoid say<strong>in</strong>g that the soul does<br />

th<strong>in</strong>gs, preferr<strong>in</strong>g his own formulation <strong>in</strong> terms of the person. “It is better<br />

not to say that the soul grieves or learns or th<strong>in</strong>ks but man <strong>in</strong> respect<br />

of his soul.” (408b13 –15). For the soul, conceived of as a purely psychological<br />

phenomenon (or set of such phenomena), is not the type<br />

of th<strong>in</strong>g which can be the subject of these <strong>in</strong>extricably psycho-physical<br />

processes. At this po<strong>in</strong>t, Aristotle is best seen as challeng<strong>in</strong>g the moves<br />

that lead to dualism at the first step: it is not the soul which is (properly<br />

speak<strong>in</strong>g) that which moves the animal but the (psycho-physical) person.<br />

The desirer is, no doubt, responsive to the goods (or goals) he seeks,<br />

themselves the start<strong>in</strong>g po<strong>in</strong>t of the process that leads to action. (In some<br />

cases these goals may be the goals of skills.) Indeed, the desirer typically<br />

aims to achieve these goals. But neither the goals themselves nor the<br />

skills are (or can plausibly be) described as ‘us<strong>in</strong>g’ desire (or the desirer)<br />

to achieve their ends. Indeed, it is the desirer who uses his skill to achieve<br />

the ends he has set himself.<br />

7. Conclusion<br />

Aristotle’s account, I have argued, does not fit <strong>in</strong>to the st<strong>and</strong>ard categories<br />

of post-Cartesian philosophy because it rejects the two assumptions<br />

that characterise it. In his view, it is not the case that<br />

[1]* There is a purely psychological feature or process <strong>in</strong>volved <strong>in</strong> desir<strong>in</strong>g<br />

(or a purely psychological description)<br />

[2]* All relevant processes <strong>and</strong> features are either purely psychological<br />

or purely physical or a comb<strong>in</strong>ation of the two.<br />

Materialist <strong>and</strong> spiritualist <strong>in</strong>terpreters have erred <strong>in</strong> see<strong>in</strong>g Aristotle as<br />

occupy<strong>in</strong>g a position <strong>in</strong> the logical space of options def<strong>in</strong>ed by Descartes.<br />

His account shows that there are more ways of underst<strong>and</strong><strong>in</strong>g<br />

the m<strong>in</strong>d/body relation than are dreamed of <strong>in</strong> post-Cartesian philosophy.<br />

It rema<strong>in</strong>s to be seen whether it can withst<strong>and</strong> serious scrut<strong>in</strong>y.

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