Body and Soul in Ancient Philosophy

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David Charles
I.1. This discussion, in my view, provides the resources to understand
central aspects of his account of desire and of ‘functions common to
the body and the soul’ On this basis, I shall investigate his description
of how the animal is moved in MA and finally comment on his talk
of ‘instruments’ in this area. While a full account of these issues lies beyond
the scope of this essay, my aim is to provide an outline of Aristotle’s
characterisation of (i) desire (ii) ‘functions common to body and
soul’ and (iii) how these lead the agent to move his (or her) body.
Aristotle’s view on these issues is, or so I shall argue, a distinctive
one. Indeed, it seems unsatisfactory to contemporary interpreters precisely
because it is not one of the standard options of post-Cartesian philosophy
(dualism, materialism, functionalism or spiritualism). It should
be seen rather as offering a radical alternative to these traditional accounts,
which challenges the basic assumptions that drive them. Post-
Cartesian theories, standardly, make two assumptions:
[1]* There is a purely psychological feature or process involved in desiring
(or a purely psychological description), such as desiring (or aiming
at) revenge.
[2]* All relevant processes and features essentially involved in desiring are
either purely psychological or purely physical or a combination of
the two.
These assumptions have been taken for granted in the exegetical debates
of the past two decades (and more) about de An. Thus, broadly materialist
interpreters represent Aristotle’s account of desire as follows:
[1] Desire is to be defined as the psychological process it is without reference
to any physical phenomena (in purely psychological terms).
[2] Desire is realised in (or constituted by/or supervenes on) a particular
process of a physical/material type.
[3] The relevant type of physical/material process can be defined without
reference to any psychological state or description.
If there were a ‘spiritualist’ interpretation, it would represent Aristotle as
holding that:
[1] Desire is to be defined as the psychological process it is without reference
to any physical phenomena (in purely psychological terms).
[2] Desire is not realised in any physical change at all (although it may
require the presence of certain physical necessary conditions).