Body and Soul in Ancient Philosophy

Heraclitus on measure and the explicit emergence of rationality 95
tice, moderation, straightness, control, and proportion. The truth of
something, according to this model, is normative. Just as lying falls outside
the norms of proper discourse, so truth also characterizes the way
something should actually be if it is functioning optimally where the
condition of functioning optimally is balance, straightness, and proper
proportion. Hence Plato’s liking for musical and mathematical illustrations
of truth. A harmonious sound is true to the relevant ratios of
the tetrachord. A well-constructed square is true to the principle that
its four sides are equal and subtend four right angles.
The beauty of truth, then, is a highly theoretical notion, grounded
on ideas of symmetry and balance. This notion, as we see in the Gorgias,
enables Plato to represent a tyrannnical soul as devoid of truth precisely
because such a soul is unbalanced, given to excess, and therefore ugly.
Such a soul fails to impose a proper ratio on itself and its actions. Like
irrationals in mathematics, which defy whole number ratio relationships,
a disorderly soul is irrational, and irrational by virtue of its lack
of proportion.
Accordingly, when Plato talks about the beauty of truth he is not
saying that the content of any true statement (or fact) must be beautiful.
The beauty of truth picks out the relation that anything with a purchase
on truth (whether a soul or an action or a statement) has to the norms of
straightness and proper proportion. Hence we can see why Plato could
regard truth telling itself as beautiful, in as much as it corresponds and
coheres with what is the case.
There is much more one could say about Plato’s conceptualization
of rationality in terms of measure and proportion. This cluster of ideas is
especially prominent in the Philebus, where it is measure that heads the
classification of goods (66a). But, I think I have said enough here to provide
a Platonic perspective or retrospective on Heraclitus. Let us return
with some detail to Heraclitus B 112:
Sôphronein is the greatest virtue and wisdom: to speak and do things that are
true, understanding them in accordance with their nature.
syvqome?m !qetµ lec¸stg ja· sov¸g, !kgh´a k´ceim ja· poie?m jat± v¼sim
1paýomtar.
Like Kahn (1979, ad loc.), I punctuate the fragment after sov¸g, thus
making the entire text a comment on good sense or practical wisdom,
which is how we may gloss sôphronein. This punctuation, rather than the
placing of a comma after lec¸stg, suits the sense and rhythm of the passage,
with its division into three cola. The last colon, “understanding [sc.