Body and Soul in Ancient Philosophy

The Pythagorean conception of the soul from Pythagoras to Philolaus 25
rooting and growth are added to mere generation, then a specific sort of
living thing, a plant, emerges. All of the lower faculties are included in
the higher sorts of organism, so that animals too will have a principle of
rooting, which is connected to the umbilical cord which serves as a root
for the embryo. It follows, however, that plants not only do not have
intellect but also lack sensation and psychÞ, which are associated with
the heart, and are the archÞ of animals. Animals in turn do not have intellect,
which is the distinctive archÞ of human beings, but do share sensation
and psychÞ with humans. What is this psychÞ which humans share
with animals but which plants lack?
In my book, I followed Burkert in arguing that it simply meant
‘life’, which is indeed a common meaning for psychÞ in the late fifthcentury.
15 Thus, when the singer Arion is about to be killed by the
crew of the Corinthian ship on which he has taken passage, Herodotus
says that he begged for his psychÞ, i.e. he begged for his life (1. 24). Over
half of the uses in Herodotus have this simple meaning ‘life’. It is clear,
however, that both Burkert and I were wrong. Certainly it is a mistake
to translate psychÞ as ‘life’ in fragment 13, since psychÞ is there denied to
plants and in English usage plants are obviously considered to be alive.
Fragment 13 itself, moreover, is clearly trying to give a hierarchical
scheme of faculties and those faculties must be related in some way;
the obvious conclusion is that they are the faculties of living things,
so that plants are as much alive as animals and men. 16 On the other
hand, it will not do simply to identify psychÞ with sensation (aisthÞsis)
as Laks does when he says “soul, localized in the heart, is recognized
as being the sensory organ” 17 . It is possible to read Philolaus’ statement
that “the heart is the seat of psychÞ and sensation” as saying that “the
heart is the seat of psychÞ, i.e. sensation”, and this is probably what
Laks intends. This interpretation is not necessary, however, and there
are two problems with it. First, the other pairs of faculties used in the
fragment, while connected, are not simple synonyms. Thus, ‘rooting’
and ‘first growth’ (literally ‘growing up’) are connected, but a root is
not the same as the shoots that grow up from it. Similarly, the initial
generation of a seed and the sowing of a seed are distinct faculties. In
15 Burkert 1972, 270; Huffman 1993, 312.
16 In my book, I clearly felt the problem, since in several cases I translated psychÞ
not as ‘life’ but ‘animal vitality’. But one must ask what sort of principle of animal
life psychÞ is intended to be. See Huffman 1993, 312.
17 Laks 1999, 252.