Body and Soul in Ancient Philosophy

Stoics on souls and demons: Reconstructing Stoic demonology 379
Hymn puts it, Zeus knows “how to make things crooked straight and to
order things disorderly; you love things unloved” 59 .
Elsewhere, however, Plutarch goes one crucial step further, arguing
that bad demons do not so much work on their own, but are actually
actively employed or even sent by god as his messengers or executioners.
The only evidence he adduces for this claim is a rather well-known fragment
from Chrysippus’ On Substance (Peq· oqs_ar). 60 The specific context
in which Plutarch introduces his quotation concerns an attempt to
show that the way the Stoics deal with the problem of the theodicy involves
crucial inconsistencies. 61 On the one hand they claim that there is
nothing reprehensible in the world, whereas on the other hand they also
speak of “cases of reprehensible neglicence” (1cjkgt\r timar !leke_ar) in
serious matters:
Moreover, although he has often written on the theme that there is nothing
reprehensible or blameworthy [in the] universe since all things are accomplished
in conformity with the best nature, yet again there are places where
he does admit instances of reprehensible negligence (1cjkgt\r timar
!leke_ar) about matters which are not trivial or paltry. At any rate, in the
third book of the On Substance he mentions the fact that such instances happen
in the case of upright and virtuous men (fti sulba_mei tim± to?r jako?r
ja· !caho?r toiaOta), and then says: ‘Is it because some things are neglected,
just as in larger households some husk gets lost and a certain quantity of
wheat also, though affairs as a whole are well managed, or is it because base
spirits are in attendance over ( jah_stashai 1p_) these things, in which case
instances of neglicence really become reprehensible as well? (1m oXrt`emti
c_momtai 1cjkgt]ai !l]keiai). And he says that necessity is also involved in
large measure’. 62
59 Cleanthes, Hymn to Zeus, SVF I, 537; with Bobzien 1998, 346 – 349.
60 For the Stoics ‘substance’ (oqs_a) is the passive principle, i.e. matter, as informed
by the active, i.e. god. It is not surprising, accordingly, that in a
work devoted to this subject questions concerning cosmic evil and the theodicy
were addressed as well.
61 According to Brenk 1987, 277, Plutarch’s text rejects a belief in evil daimonia ‘as
contradictory to the notion of divine providence’. Yet, the existence of demons
as such is not what this text is really about. Plutarch merely exploits the question
whether the concept of bad demons could do the work it is supposed to do
within Chrysippus’ system (if, that is, we take the quotation from Chrysippus
seriously), and he concludes that, given Chrysippus’ monistic conception of divine
providence, the introduction of evil demons fails to exculpate god. He is
not concerned with the plausibility or implausibility of the notion of evil demons
as such.
62 Plutarch, St. rep. 1051c (SVF II, 1178).