Body and Soul in Ancient Philosophy

294
David Charles
Mathematical objects: they are existentially inseparable from but separable
in definition from perceptual matter.
In the latter case, the mathematician initially abstracts and then separates
his objects from all perceptual matter in thought and no error arises (in
his purely mathematical reasoning) when he does so (see also Metaph.
M.3, 1078a17; Ph. B.1, 193b34–5.) By contrast, in the case of anger,
[A] The psychological features that are essential to being angry (that is,
desiring revenge) are inseparable in definition from the processes
with physical properties to which they belong. Indeed, the relevant
features are inextricably psycho-physical.
[B] The psycho-physical features (specified in [A]) are essential to the
identity of the processes to which they belong: the processes to
which the psycho-physical features belong are essentially psychophysical
processes.
[C] There is no other process (other than the one specified in [B])
which is essential to being angry.
Aristotle produces some considerations in favour of these claims in de
An. I.1.1. In favour of [A] he argues as follows: one who grasps what
it is to be angry must know that it involves certain specific bodily states;
otherwise they will go wrong in their account of when one gets angry/
what anger is. More specifically: he suggests that the presence of some
bodily state is necessary if anger and fear are to occur (403a19 –20):
“Sometimes one is not stimulated or made afraid by great external misfortunes
[i.e.: when the body is not affected].” Next, he claims that such
bodily states are an essential part of the explanation of when one is angry
or afraid. For sometimes (as he notes) one is moved to anger by small or
insignificant events, when the body is stirred up (orgą) and is in the type
of condition one is in when angry (403a20–2). Sometimes, even when
nothing frightening happens, one is still afraid (in the emotional states of
the person who is afraid). 3 In the latter case, presumably, one experiences
fear because of the presence of some internal bodily state, even in the
absence of an external cause (403a23 –24).
3 I take this sentence as providing a further proof of the claim made at 403a18 –
19: the body suffers at the same time as the pathÞ of the soul (just listed) occur.
That is, ‘touto’ in 403a23 refers back to the claim in 403a18 – 19 as further evidence
(along with the claims made in 403a19 – 21). It seems implausible to take
this sentence as making clear the quite different situation mentioned in the previous
sentence: “being moved by small occurrences”.