Body and Soul in Ancient Philosophy

The Pythagorean conception of the soul from Pythagoras to Philolaus 29
in transmigration. These considerations are hardly conclusive, but nonetheless
they show that it is important to consider whether the view of
soul found in fragment 13 and the testimonia for Philolaus is consistent
with the doctrine of transmigration.
The question of Philolaus’ belief in transmigration is complicated by
a still further question: did he believe that the soul was a harmony?
There is no direct assertion of such a doctrine in the fragments, and neither
the evidence of the doxographical tradition nor the evidence of the
Phaedo leads to a clear answer to the question. 22 Nonetheless, Philolaus’
metaphysical system, as found in the surviving fragments, suggests that
he may have thought the soul to be a harmony. That system presents
all things as falling into one of three classes: limiters, unlimiteds, or harmonies
of limiters and unlimiteds (fr. 2). All things that exhibit order are
said to be harmonies of limiters and unlimiteds (fr. 6), so that it would
appear that soul should fall in the class of harmony. 23 The association of
psychÞ with a physical part of the human body, the heart, in fragment 13,
and Plato’s description of the harmony that constitutes the soul as a harmony
of physical elements in the Phaedo, have led many scholars to conclude
that Philolaus must have explained the soul as a harmony of this
sort. In light of this and Aristotle’s comment that some Pythagoreans
thought that the soul was the motes of dust in the air or what moved
them (de An. 404a16), I earlier suggested that Philolaus thought of the
soul “as a group of constantly moving elements in attunement located
in the heart” 24 . David Sedley, although agreeing that Philolaus thought
22 Macrobius in the 5th cent. AD assigns this doctrine to both Pythagoras and Philolaus.
A single late testimonium of this sort cannot carry much weight and is
more likely to be an inference from Plato’s Phaedo than based on anything in
Philolaus’ book (Huffman 1993, 323 – 327). Does the Phaedo, then, suggest
that Philolaus believed the soul to be a harmony? This question has been
much discussed but again the evidence does not allow for a firm conclusion
(Guthrie 1962, 309 –310; Huffman 1993, 326–327). The doctrine is certainly
not explicitly ascribed to him in the dialogue. Echecrates, who is identified as a
student of Philolaus, probably on the authority of Aristoxenus (D.L. 8.46 =
fr. 19 Wehrli), admits an attraction for the doctrine (88d3), but Simmias,
who is presented as an auditor of Philolaus in the dialogue, is the one who develops
the argument to show that the theory of the soul as harmony is inconsistent
with the belief in the immortality of the soul (86b5). It is hard to know
what to conclude about the views of the teacher from these views of the students.
23 Huffman 1993, 328.
24 Huffman 1993, 329.