Emissions Scenarios - IPCC
Emissions Scenarios - IPCC
Emissions Scenarios - IPCC
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112 Scenario Driving Forces<br />
productivity (per capita economic output) would balance<br />
shortfalls from possible reductions in the labor force (Disney,<br />
1996) . However, lowered fertility and mortality rates will also<br />
cause the elderly dependency ratio to increase, which might<br />
lead to a trend of lower savings, characteristic of elderly<br />
cohorts, which have a reduced incentive to save. In terms of<br />
public savings, without institutional reforms aging could<br />
eventually lead to severe strains on social security and health<br />
care programs supported by governments and thus to reduced<br />
goventmental savings (US Council of Economic Advisors,<br />
1997) .<br />
Interestingly, a case has been made that aging may have<br />
significant impacts on future CO2 emissions. The suggested<br />
mechanism for this relates to household formation rate<br />
(MacKellar et al., 1995). An aging population has a greater<br />
proportion of people in older age groups. Assuming agespecific<br />
household foimation rates remain constant over time,<br />
as more people enter the older age cohorts the overall<br />
household formation rates will increase. This increase will be<br />
accompanied by a decline in the number of people per<br />
household (a process already observed in industrialized<br />
countries) and is related to reduced fertility rates. As small<br />
households consume significantly more energy per person than<br />
large households (Ironmonger et al., 1995), the various effects<br />
suggest COj emissions will increase with increased aging<br />
(MacKellar et al., 1995). Important uncertainties of this effect<br />
remain, not least because household formation rates of aging<br />
populations are not well understood.<br />
3.2.4.2. Urbanization<br />
Urbanization is also a strongly anticipated demographic trend.<br />
Since 1970, most urban growth has taken place in developing<br />
countries. It is caused by both intemal increases of the existing<br />
urban population and rural-to-urban migration (UN, 1997b).<br />
Urbanization, though, is not a rigorously modeled phenomenon<br />
within the projections. Essentially, future urban and rural<br />
growth and decline rates are simply assumed and applied to the<br />
projected population levels. Thus, the projections contain no<br />
explicit feedback mechanism from urbanization to population<br />
growth, even though urbanization is an important factor in<br />
fertility rate changes (urban populations generally have lower<br />
fertility rates than rural populations). Instead, urbanization<br />
rates are considered implicitiy within the projections of future<br />
fertility. It is estimated that by 2010 more than half of the<br />
world's population will live in urban areas (UN, 1996).<br />
Urbanization will lead to a rapid expansion of infrastructure<br />
and especially transportation uses (Wexler, 1996). In addition,<br />
urban households in developing countries use significantiy<br />
more fossil fuels, as opposed to biofuels, than do rural<br />
households. However, the choice of fuel is predominantly an<br />
income effect rather than a function of locale (see Murthy et<br />
ai, 1997), even within urban settings. Hence, urbanization<br />
exerts its influence on emissions primarily via higher urban<br />
incomes compared to rural ones. Generally, opportunities for<br />
higher income are considered an important driver of rural-tourban<br />
migration, and so contribute to rising urbanization rates<br />
(HABITAT, 1996). Urbanization is obviously an important<br />
factor for future GHG emissions.<br />
3.2.5. Relationships<br />
3.2.5.1. Introduction<br />
Within the caveats in Section 3.1, a number of demographic<br />
studies show that population change does exert a strong firstorder<br />
scaling effect on CO^ emissions models (O'Neill, 1996;<br />
Gaffin and O'Neill, 1997; O'Neill et al., 2000; Wexler, 1996).<br />
These studies support the notion that population growth and<br />
the policies that affect it are key factors for future emissions.<br />
Balanced against this, however, are other studies that take a<br />
more skeptical view (Kolsrud and Torrey, 1992; Birdsall, 1994;<br />
Preston, 1996). A full review of model results that address this<br />
question is given in O'Neill (1996) and Gaffin and O'Neill<br />
(1997) and is not be reproduced here because of space<br />
limitations (for a review see Gaffin, 1998). In essence, the<br />
controversy is one of the relationships between population<br />
growth and economic development, as well as other salient<br />
factors that influence emissions. These relationships were first<br />
discussed within the context of <strong>IPCC</strong> emissions scenarios by<br />
Alcamo et al. (1995) and are discussed in more detail in the<br />
following sections.<br />
3.2.5.2. The Effect of Economic Growth on Population<br />
Growth<br />
Figure 3-7 shows the long-established negative coirelation<br />
between fertility rates and per capita income. Clearly, richer<br />
countries uniformly have a relatively low fertility rate. Poorer<br />
countries, on average, have a higher fertility rate. Lower<br />
fertility, however, does exist in some poor countries or regions,<br />
which illustrates the importance of social and institutional<br />
structures.<br />
Barro (1997) reports a statistically significant cortelation<br />
between per capita GDP growth and the variables life<br />
expectancy and fertility in his analysis of post-1960 growth<br />
performance of 100 countries. Other things being equal,<br />
growth rates correlate positively (higher) with increasing life<br />
expectancy and negatively (lower) widi high fertility, which<br />
confiims the view that the affluent live longer and have fewer<br />
children.<br />
Figure 3-7, a snapshot of many counûies passing through the<br />
"demographic fertility transition" can be explained from both<br />
economic and socio-demographic points of view (Easterlin,<br />
1978). Economically, Figure 3-7 can be interpreted as a<br />
reflection of the substitution that families make - away from<br />
having children and toward consuming more goods and<br />
services. With greater wealth, both goods and services become<br />
increasingly available as part of the families' "basket of<br />
choices" for consumption and, accordingly, they shift away