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Emissions Scenarios - IPCC

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112 Scenario Driving Forces<br />

productivity (per capita economic output) would balance<br />

shortfalls from possible reductions in the labor force (Disney,<br />

1996) . However, lowered fertility and mortality rates will also<br />

cause the elderly dependency ratio to increase, which might<br />

lead to a trend of lower savings, characteristic of elderly<br />

cohorts, which have a reduced incentive to save. In terms of<br />

public savings, without institutional reforms aging could<br />

eventually lead to severe strains on social security and health<br />

care programs supported by governments and thus to reduced<br />

goventmental savings (US Council of Economic Advisors,<br />

1997) .<br />

Interestingly, a case has been made that aging may have<br />

significant impacts on future CO2 emissions. The suggested<br />

mechanism for this relates to household formation rate<br />

(MacKellar et al., 1995). An aging population has a greater<br />

proportion of people in older age groups. Assuming agespecific<br />

household foimation rates remain constant over time,<br />

as more people enter the older age cohorts the overall<br />

household formation rates will increase. This increase will be<br />

accompanied by a decline in the number of people per<br />

household (a process already observed in industrialized<br />

countries) and is related to reduced fertility rates. As small<br />

households consume significantly more energy per person than<br />

large households (Ironmonger et al., 1995), the various effects<br />

suggest COj emissions will increase with increased aging<br />

(MacKellar et al., 1995). Important uncertainties of this effect<br />

remain, not least because household formation rates of aging<br />

populations are not well understood.<br />

3.2.4.2. Urbanization<br />

Urbanization is also a strongly anticipated demographic trend.<br />

Since 1970, most urban growth has taken place in developing<br />

countries. It is caused by both intemal increases of the existing<br />

urban population and rural-to-urban migration (UN, 1997b).<br />

Urbanization, though, is not a rigorously modeled phenomenon<br />

within the projections. Essentially, future urban and rural<br />

growth and decline rates are simply assumed and applied to the<br />

projected population levels. Thus, the projections contain no<br />

explicit feedback mechanism from urbanization to population<br />

growth, even though urbanization is an important factor in<br />

fertility rate changes (urban populations generally have lower<br />

fertility rates than rural populations). Instead, urbanization<br />

rates are considered implicitiy within the projections of future<br />

fertility. It is estimated that by 2010 more than half of the<br />

world's population will live in urban areas (UN, 1996).<br />

Urbanization will lead to a rapid expansion of infrastructure<br />

and especially transportation uses (Wexler, 1996). In addition,<br />

urban households in developing countries use significantiy<br />

more fossil fuels, as opposed to biofuels, than do rural<br />

households. However, the choice of fuel is predominantly an<br />

income effect rather than a function of locale (see Murthy et<br />

ai, 1997), even within urban settings. Hence, urbanization<br />

exerts its influence on emissions primarily via higher urban<br />

incomes compared to rural ones. Generally, opportunities for<br />

higher income are considered an important driver of rural-tourban<br />

migration, and so contribute to rising urbanization rates<br />

(HABITAT, 1996). Urbanization is obviously an important<br />

factor for future GHG emissions.<br />

3.2.5. Relationships<br />

3.2.5.1. Introduction<br />

Within the caveats in Section 3.1, a number of demographic<br />

studies show that population change does exert a strong firstorder<br />

scaling effect on CO^ emissions models (O'Neill, 1996;<br />

Gaffin and O'Neill, 1997; O'Neill et al., 2000; Wexler, 1996).<br />

These studies support the notion that population growth and<br />

the policies that affect it are key factors for future emissions.<br />

Balanced against this, however, are other studies that take a<br />

more skeptical view (Kolsrud and Torrey, 1992; Birdsall, 1994;<br />

Preston, 1996). A full review of model results that address this<br />

question is given in O'Neill (1996) and Gaffin and O'Neill<br />

(1997) and is not be reproduced here because of space<br />

limitations (for a review see Gaffin, 1998). In essence, the<br />

controversy is one of the relationships between population<br />

growth and economic development, as well as other salient<br />

factors that influence emissions. These relationships were first<br />

discussed within the context of <strong>IPCC</strong> emissions scenarios by<br />

Alcamo et al. (1995) and are discussed in more detail in the<br />

following sections.<br />

3.2.5.2. The Effect of Economic Growth on Population<br />

Growth<br />

Figure 3-7 shows the long-established negative coirelation<br />

between fertility rates and per capita income. Clearly, richer<br />

countries uniformly have a relatively low fertility rate. Poorer<br />

countries, on average, have a higher fertility rate. Lower<br />

fertility, however, does exist in some poor countries or regions,<br />

which illustrates the importance of social and institutional<br />

structures.<br />

Barro (1997) reports a statistically significant cortelation<br />

between per capita GDP growth and the variables life<br />

expectancy and fertility in his analysis of post-1960 growth<br />

performance of 100 countries. Other things being equal,<br />

growth rates correlate positively (higher) with increasing life<br />

expectancy and negatively (lower) widi high fertility, which<br />

confiims the view that the affluent live longer and have fewer<br />

children.<br />

Figure 3-7, a snapshot of many counûies passing through the<br />

"demographic fertility transition" can be explained from both<br />

economic and socio-demographic points of view (Easterlin,<br />

1978). Economically, Figure 3-7 can be interpreted as a<br />

reflection of the substitution that families make - away from<br />

having children and toward consuming more goods and<br />

services. With greater wealth, both goods and services become<br />

increasingly available as part of the families' "basket of<br />

choices" for consumption and, accordingly, they shift away

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