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Emissions Scenarios - IPCC

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124 Scenario Driving Forces<br />

Figure 3-12: Metals intensity of<br />

use per unit of GDP as a function<br />

of GDP per capita for 13 world<br />

regions. Metals include refined<br />

steel and MedAUoy (the sum of<br />

copper, lead, zinc, tin, and nickel).<br />

GDP here is measured in terms of<br />

purchasing power parities (PPP).<br />

The dashed curves are isolines that<br />

represent a constant per capita<br />

consumption of metals. The thick<br />

pink line indicates the inverse U-<br />

shaped curve that best describes the<br />

trends in the different regions as<br />

part of a global metal model. Data<br />

source: Van Vuuren et al., 2000.<br />

regions', again as a function of per capita income (Nakicenovic<br />

et al., 1998a).<br />

The most important conclusion to retain from Figures 3-12 and<br />

3-13 is that energy and materials intensity (i.e. energy use per<br />

unit of economic output) tend to decline with rising levels of<br />

GDP per capita. Thus, energy and material productivity - the<br />

inverse of energy intensity - improve in line with overall<br />

macroeconomic productivity (as represented, e.g., by GDP per<br />

capita levels). Also, they tend to deteriorate when productivity<br />

levels fall, as happened during the start of the deep economic<br />

recession in Central and Eastem Europe (Govemment of<br />

Russian Federation, 1995). A corollary of this relationship is<br />

that material and energy intensities decline the faster per capita<br />

income grows. Thus, overall economic productivity growth<br />

(GDP per capita growth) and reductions in materials and<br />

energy use per unit GDP (materials and energy productivity<br />

growth) are closely related. The fundamental reason is that<br />

high macroeconomic growth presupposes accelerated rates of<br />

technical change and corresponds with a fast turnover of<br />

capital stock and, hence, a faster incorporation in the economy.<br />

This represents an important new finding for long-term energy<br />

and emissions scenarios that have, to date, largely treated<br />

economic and resource productivity growth as independent of<br />

' The regional definition used in Nakicenovic et al., 1998a, includes:<br />

AFR: Sub-saharan Africa; CPA: China and Centrally Planned Asia;<br />

EEU: Central and Eastem Europe; FSU: Newly Independent States<br />

of the former Soviet Union; LAM: Latin America and the Caribbean;<br />

MEA: Middle East and North Africa; PAO: Pacific OECD;<br />

Other Pacific Asia; SAS: South Asia; WEU: Western Europe.<br />

PAS:<br />

each other. According to recent empirical and theoretical<br />

findings, they no longer can.<br />

Two final caveats are important. First, growth in productivity<br />

and intensity improvement growth have historically been<br />

outpaced by economic output growth. Hence, materials and<br />

energy use has risen in absolute tenns (see Nriagu, 1996;<br />

Watson et ai, 1996; Griibler, 1998a). The second caveat is that<br />

energy and material intensity are affected by many factors<br />

other than macroeconomic productivity growth and resultant<br />

income. OECD (1998b) notes that high rates of productivity<br />

increase have been associated in the past with new competitive<br />

pressures, strong price or regulatory incentives, catching up or<br />

recovery, and a good "climate for innovation." Also, the<br />

emergence of new technologies and resource-strategic<br />

considerations has led to rapid productivity growth.<br />

Table 3-3 summarizes selected macroeconomic, labor, energy,<br />

and material productivity increases that have been achieved in<br />

a range of economies and sectors at different times. Principally,<br />

it demonstrates that the least likely assumption for future<br />

scenarios from historical evidence is absence of productivity<br />

growth. Human ingenuity (as reflected in new technologies and<br />

new practices) historically has responded to puiposeful action<br />

(R&D and inventive activities) and to a wide range of policies<br />

to improve vastly productivity in the use of all factors of<br />

production. Of course, it remains uncertain how future<br />

productivity growth rates will diffuse nationally, regionally,<br />

and internationally. The essential lesson provided by history is<br />

that change is continuous and pervasive. From that perspective,<br />

static or "business-as-usual" scenarios need to be replaced by<br />

"dynamics-as-usual" scenarios, which divide into "fast" and

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