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Emissions Scenarios - IPCC

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120 Scenario Driving Forces<br />

when changes in quality and composition of factors of<br />

production are accounted for, increases in per capita economic<br />

output (productivity) remain largely unexplained, a "residual"<br />

in the analysis remains unclear (for a review, see Griliches,<br />

1996). The "residual," is usually ascribed to "advances in<br />

knowledge and technology" which, unlike capital and labor,<br />

cannot be measured directly. However, it might also be the<br />

result of other influences, which potentially include growing<br />

contributions to the economy by non-market or under-priced<br />

natural resources. Thus, considerable measurement and<br />

interpretative uncertainties remain in the explanation of<br />

productivity growth.<br />

New approaches and models extended the neoclassic growth<br />

model (e.g., Romer, 1986; Lucas, 1988; Grossmann and<br />

Helpman, 1991, 1993). In these, increases in human capital<br />

through education and the importance of technological<br />

innovation via directed activity (research and development<br />

(R&D)) complement more traditional approaches, which<br />

represents a return to the earlier work of Schumpeter (1943),<br />

Kuznets (1958), Nelson et al. (1967), and Landes (1969).<br />

3.3.4.2. Influence of Demographics<br />

Neoclassic economic growth theory embraces as a general<br />

principle the notion that long-term per capita income growth<br />

rate is independent of population growth rate. Thus, a rapidly<br />

growing population should not necessarily slow down a<br />

countries' economic development. Blanchet (1991)<br />

summarizes the country-level data. Prior to 1980, the<br />

overwhelming majority of studies showed no significant<br />

correlation between population growth and economic growth<br />

(National Research Council, 1986). Recent correlation studies,<br />

however, suggest a statistically significant, but weak, inverse<br />

relationship for the 1970s and 1980s, despite no correlation<br />

being established previously (Blanchet, 1991). As noted in<br />

Section 3.2, the reverse effect of income growth on<br />

demographics is much clearer.<br />

Population aging is another consideration advanced as having<br />

significant influence on economic growth rates. Reductions in<br />

workforce availability and excessive social security and<br />

pension expenditures are cited as possible drivers. Section 3.2<br />

above concluded that evidence for a strong negative impact is<br />

rather elusive. Two additional points deserve consideration.<br />

First, population aging is not necessarily the best indicator for<br />

workforce availabifity, because while the percentage of the<br />

elderly, in particular those of retirement age, increases, the<br />

proportion of younger people (of pre-work or -career age)<br />

decreases. As a result, the percentage of the working age<br />

population (age 15 to 65 years) in the total population<br />

changes less dramatically, even in scenarios of pronounced<br />

aging. For instance, in the IIASA low population scenario (7<br />

billion world population by 2100) discussed in Section 3.2,<br />

the percentage of age categories 15 to 65 years changes from<br />

62% in 1995 to 54% by 2100. This percentage falls to 48% in<br />

the regions with the highest population aging (Lutz et al.,<br />

1996).<br />

A second point is that these demographic variables only<br />

indicate potential workforce numbers. Actual gainfully<br />

employed workforce numbers are influenced by additional<br />

important variables - unemployment levels, female workforce<br />

participation rates, and finally working time. The importance<br />

of these variables can be illustrated by a few statistics.<br />

Currently, about 40 million people are unemployed in the<br />

OECD countries (UNDP, 1997). The female workforce<br />

participation ratios vary enormously, from about 10% to 48%<br />

of the workforce (as in Saudi Arabia and Sweden, respectively;<br />

UNDP, 1997), and have been changing dramatically over time.<br />

For the US, for instance, female workforce participation rates<br />

increased from 17% in 1890 (US DOC, 1975) to 45% in 1990<br />

(UNDP, 1997). Similar dramatic long-term changes have<br />

occurred in the number of working hours in all industrial<br />

countries. Compared to the mid-19* century, the number of<br />

average working hours has declined from about 3000 to about<br />

1500 (Maddison, 1995; Ausubel and Grübler, 1995). However,<br />

in most OECD countries the trend in working time reductions<br />

has slowed to a halt since the early 1980s (Marchand, 1992).<br />

Thus, unless the rather implausible assumption is made that<br />

with population aging all these other important determinants of<br />

labor input remain unchanged, the impacts of aging are likely<br />

to be compensated by corresponding changes in these variables<br />

(e.g. greater female workforce participation, earlier retirement,<br />

etc.). Finally, it must be reiterated that quahtative labor force<br />

characteristics, most notably education, are a more important<br />

determinant for long-ran productivity and hence economic<br />

growth than mere workforce numbers.<br />

3.3.4.3. Influence of Social and Institutional Changes<br />

The importance of social and institutional changes to provide<br />

conditions that enabled the acceleration of the Industrial<br />

Revolution is widely acknowledged (Rosenberg and Birdzell,<br />

1986, 1990). Rostow (1990) and Landes (1969) identify many<br />

social and cultural factors in the "preconditions for economic<br />

acceleration" and in the process of economic development.<br />

The importance of institutions and stable social environments<br />

is also increasingly discussed in the literature concerned with<br />

current economic growth (World Bank, 1991, 1998a). Barro<br />

(1997), and Barro and Sala-I-Martin (1995) report a<br />

statistically significant relationship between rule-of-law and<br />

democracy indices with per capita GDP growth. Law<br />

enforcement and legal rights are important indicators for<br />

human development in their own right, but enforceable legal<br />

contracts are equally important for markets to function. Other<br />

socio-institutional factors have been identified that are<br />

important to productivity and economic growth: education is<br />

mentioned above. Income inequaUty (and resultant social<br />

tensions) also appears to coirelate negatively with economic<br />

development (Worid Bank, 1998a; Maddison, 1995).<br />

Strong parallels run between social, institutional, and<br />

technological changes (Grübler, 1998a; OECD, 1998a). In<br />

particular, many features common to the processes of evolution

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