Emissions Scenarios - IPCC

Scenario Driving Forces 125
GDP per capita 1990US$
100000
Figure 3-13: Energy intensity (all
energy forms in the higher curves,
and commercial energy only in the
lower curves) as a function of
GDP per capita for 11 world
regions since 1970. For an
explanation of regional
abbreviations see text. Historical
data for the USA since 1800 are
equally shown. Source: adapted
from Nakicenovic et al., 1998a.
"slow" alternatives as a function of perceived opportunities,
new institutional configurations, policies, and environmental
constraints, even if these do not include climate policies (as
mandated by the SRES Terms of Reference, see Appendix I).
For instance, low historical rates of energy intensity
improvement reflect the low priority placed on energy
efficiency by most producers and users of technology. On
average energy costs account for only about 5% of GDP. Energy
intensity reductions average about 1 % per year, in contrast to
improvements in labor productivity above 2% per year over the
period 1870 to 1992. Over shorter time periods, and given
appropriate incentives, energy intensity improvement rates can
be substantially higher, as in the OECD countries after 1973 or
in China since 1977, where energy intensity improvement rates
of 5% have been observed. Rapid productivity growth can also
occur during periods of successful economic catch-up; for
instance, Japanese labor productivity grew at 7.7% annually
during 1950-1973 (Maddison, 1995). Similar high-productivity
growths were also achieved in industrial oil usage in the OECD
or US car fuel economies after 1973. Of the examples given in
Table 3-3, productivity increases are the highest for
communication. Not surprisingly, many observers consider that
given a continuation of historical trends communication may
become a similarly important driver of economic growth in the
future as traditional, resource- and energy-intensive industries
have been in the past.
3.3.4.8. Development Patterns
The key questions about how future development pattems
deteimine GHG emissions thus include the following.
Material and energy content of development in industrial
countries:
• Will stmctural change toward services and increasing
importance of information as a "raw material" reduce
the energy and matter content of economic activity?
• Will telecommunications substitute significantly for
travel or encourage more of it?
• Will growth in transportation and other energy-using
activities, stimulated by trade liberaHzation, be offset
by less material intensive development pattems?
• Will the tendency to saturation in some energy end-use
requirements be offset by new energy or GHG intensive
goods and services (e.g., in leisure activities)?
Development patterns in the developing countries:
• Will developing countties reproduce the development
paths of industrial countries with respect to energy use
and GHG emissions?
• Is there a potential for technological "leapfrogging"
whereby developing countries bypass dirty intermediate
technologies and jump straight to cleaner teclmologies?
Links among energy, transport and urban planning:
• Will modal choices and urban-form decisions tend
toward less or greater energy intensity?
• How are significant differences within and between
industrial and developing countries going to evolve in
the future?
Land use and human settlements:
• What are the links between agriculture, forestry, mralto-urban
migration, energy use, GHG, and sulfur
emissions, particularly in developing countries?