REMEMBRANCE IN TIME - Index of

306
Remembrance in Time
Although the Anglo-Americans have repeatedly encouraged the leaders of the
National Peasants’ Party and of the Liberal Party, Western chancelleries knew even since
1945 the results of the upcoming elections in Bucharest. During a conversation with the
American Ambassador Harriman in December 1945, Soviet Vice-commissary Vîşinski
foresaw a victory of the government `by 70%`. Following the same prognostic, the Soviet
Ambassador to Bucharest said prior to the elections that the communist party could hope
to obtain` through certain techniques` even 90% of votes 4 .
Shortly after the representatives of the National Peasants’ Party and of the National
Liberal Party, Emil HaŃieganu and Mihail Romniceanu, were admitted in the government
as ministers without portfolio, the communists started a denigration and marginalization
campaign against them. During the meeting held by the Extended Political Bureau on
January 8, 1946, Vasile Luca said: „These two persons have to be unmasked and isolated
from the reactionary parties before the public opinion, but the campaign does not have to
take a form against which the foreign forces could react. We need an extraordinary ability
and elasticity to fulfil these tasks, this strategy of the Party` 5 .
At the end of the meeting Gheorghiu-Dej concluded: „We have to set up a battle plan
for our journalists on how to attack Ministers Romniceanu and HaŃieganu. To prepare
traps. We shall cavil at them with great ability and versatility. I can friendly argue with
him in the Council of Ministers, then come out with him arm in arm and make him speak
so that the journalists can hear` 6 .
In their capacity as ministers without portfolios, their role was considerably
diminished. Ana Pauker remarked it during one of her interventions: `The Moscow
Decision aimed to help us as follows: the 18-minister government will remain as it is,
with only one change, which in fact almost does not exist` 7 . In reality the Moscow
agreement brought only one surface change for Groza’s government in Bucharest in order
to reduce the Anglo-American reactions against the undemocratic policy of the regime
which was ruling in Romania.
As if anticipating the future, Iuliu Maniu conditioned his participation in the
government on receiving firm warranties from the government for free elections and
freedom of the press. By speculating any opposition from their political adversary, the
communists criticized Maniu’s attitude and considered that he breached the Moscow
agreement as he did not provide his collaboration and loyalty within the government,
when calling his representative during the government meeting. 8 .
The guidelines of the Romanian Communist Party in the upcoming elections
weredecidedat the Plenary Session of the Central Committee of January 27-29, 1946 9 .
The main objective of the Plenary Session was to set up a political platform based on
which all democratic forces are gathered in a block, with a program `neither of the
4
Adrian Cioroianu, Pe umerii lui Marx, Bucureşti, 2005, p. 65.
5
ANIC, fond CC la PCR-Cancelarie, dosar nr. 5/1946, f. 8.
6
Ibidem, ff. 15-16.
7
Ibidem, f. 11.
8
Ibidem, f. 10.
9
Coord. Virgiliu łârău şi Ioan Marius Bucur, Strategii şi politici electorale în alegerile
parlamentare din 19 noiembrie 1946, Cluj-Napoca, 1998, pp. 1-90.