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Regional Basic Professional Training Course in Korea

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<strong>Regional</strong> <strong>Basic</strong> <strong>Professional</strong> <strong>Tra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g</strong> <strong>Course</strong> (BPTC) on Nuclear Safety<br />

described <strong>in</strong> an IAEA Bullet<strong>in</strong>, see Ref. [1]:<br />

“Compliance‐based” regulation. This approach typically <strong>in</strong>volves the regulator provid<strong>in</strong>g<br />

prescriptive standards and requirements ‐ the same for every plant ‐ for operators to<br />

follow. In this regime, <strong>in</strong>spection and enforcement are largely a matter of verify<strong>in</strong>g<br />

compliance with these rules and penaliz<strong>in</strong>g non‐compliance. The German KTA safety<br />

standards are an example of this type.<br />

“Performance‐based” regulation. In this approach, licensees are required to comply with<br />

safety objectives, but have some flexibility to decide how they achieve that. Safety<br />

performance <strong>in</strong>dicators are used by the regulator to observe trends <strong>in</strong> safety, and<br />

<strong>in</strong>spection activities focus on these <strong>in</strong>dicators. A difficulty with this approach, however, is<br />

that the <strong>in</strong>dicators used can be manipulated (i.e. efforts may be devoted to improv<strong>in</strong>g the<br />

<strong>in</strong>dicators, rather than improv<strong>in</strong>g safety itself). Furthermore, it is difficult to f<strong>in</strong>d safety<br />

performance <strong>in</strong>dicators that are predictive ‐ i.e. that can be used to identify potential<br />

problems before they develop <strong>in</strong>to real ones ‐ and therefore this approach rema<strong>in</strong>s<br />

essentially reactive. As an example, one consequence of improv<strong>in</strong>g safety culture may be<br />

an <strong>in</strong>crease <strong>in</strong> the number of safety related “events” or problems reported, as the result of<br />

better report<strong>in</strong>g by staff. It is important that regulators (as well as managers) are able to<br />

dist<strong>in</strong>guish a positive trend of this type from a negative one <strong>in</strong> which more problems are<br />

occurr<strong>in</strong>g because of deteriorat<strong>in</strong>g safety performance. This requires a more sophisticated<br />

approach to <strong>in</strong>spection than simple “<strong>in</strong>cident count<strong>in</strong>g”, and more positive safety<br />

<strong>in</strong>dicators may be of value.<br />

“Process‐based” regulation (or “Integral Supervision of Nuclear Power Plants”). This<br />

approach takes specific account of the fact that the safe operation of nuclear facilities<br />

depends on the effectiveness of the organizational processes established to operate,<br />

ma<strong>in</strong>ta<strong>in</strong>, modify, and improve a facility. Briefly put, the process approach focuses on the<br />

organizational systems that the facility has developed to assure the ongo<strong>in</strong>g safe operation<br />

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