04.02.2013 Views

Regional Basic Professional Training Course in Korea

Regional Basic Professional Training Course in Korea

Regional Basic Professional Training Course in Korea

SHOW MORE
SHOW LESS

You also want an ePaper? Increase the reach of your titles

YUMPU automatically turns print PDFs into web optimized ePapers that Google loves.

❙ 585 ❙<br />

9. Probabilistic Safety Analysis<br />

1. The approach shall rely as far as possible on real experience. This experience can<br />

be operational events and <strong>in</strong>cidents, and simulator tests, as well as visits and<br />

<strong>in</strong>terviews. In case of post-accident <strong>in</strong>teractions, although some transferability<br />

studies are necessary, simulator experiments appear as the most important source of<br />

<strong>in</strong>formation.<br />

2. The approach has to take <strong>in</strong>to account the specific situation of the plant under study,<br />

by an analysis of the man-mach<strong>in</strong>e <strong>in</strong>terface (<strong>in</strong>dicators), the documentation<br />

available for the operators (normal and emergency operat<strong>in</strong>g procedures (EOPs)),<br />

the operational practices (for example workload), and the tra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g of the operators.<br />

3. The approach has to take <strong>in</strong>to account as far as possible elements given by human<br />

factor sciences. This aspect is difficult to describe <strong>in</strong> detail, but a first step is to<br />

<strong>in</strong>clude (or at least to consult) a human factors specialist <strong>in</strong> the HRA team.<br />

9.3.5.3. Pre-accident actions<br />

Category A actions:<br />

This category covers latent errors that contribute to the unavailability of equipment.<br />

Examples of category A actions are miscalibration of sensors, misalignment of valves or<br />

of subsystems, failure to restore power supplies, failure to remove bypasses on protection<br />

systems, and failure to remove locks on pumps/valves. These failures are identified<br />

dur<strong>in</strong>g system analysis.<br />

A well-known and appropriate approach is THERP method [9.14] that provides tables for<br />

quantification. Moreover, a validation by plant specific experience should be desirable.<br />

Particular attention has to be paid to the treatment of recoveries and of dependencies<br />

between category A actions.<br />

Category B actions:<br />

This category covers all the human actions that could lead to <strong>in</strong>itiat<strong>in</strong>g events.

Hooray! Your file is uploaded and ready to be published.

Saved successfully!

Ooh no, something went wrong!