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Regional Basic Professional Training Course in Korea

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<strong>Regional</strong> <strong>Basic</strong> <strong>Professional</strong> <strong>Tra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g</strong> <strong>Course</strong> (BPTC) on Nuclear Safety<br />

damage, which they should not, radionuclide release will be easily limited by the<br />

conta<strong>in</strong>ment. If, however, a core melt accident should occur, it has been found that the<br />

debris can be reta<strong>in</strong>ed with<strong>in</strong> the reactor vessel under certa<strong>in</strong> conditions. The TMI‐2<br />

accident, which began as a small‐break LOCA and escalated <strong>in</strong>to a large‐scale core melt,<br />

showed that the debris could be cooled <strong>in</strong>‐vessel with water addition.<br />

Primary system failures<br />

Failure modes of the primary coolant pressure boundary <strong>in</strong>clude: pip<strong>in</strong>g leaks; pip<strong>in</strong>g<br />

breaks; pump seal failures; steam generator tube failures; value failures or misalignment;<br />

and pressure vessel failure.<br />

Pip<strong>in</strong>g leaks ‐ Leaks <strong>in</strong> the primary system pip<strong>in</strong>g core occur from various causes,<br />

<strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g through‐wall cracks. Such leakage can be detected by abnormal radiation<br />

read<strong>in</strong>gs, loss of coolant <strong>in</strong>ventory, or direct observation of leakage. Detection and<br />

<strong>in</strong>vestigation of any leakage is extremely important, because leaks can provide a warn<strong>in</strong>g<br />

of an impend<strong>in</strong>g pipe break. The so‐called “leak‐before‐break” theory argues that leakage<br />

will always precede a pipe break and that the leakage can be detected and action taken<br />

before a break occurs, so that <strong>in</strong>stantaneous double‐ended “guillot<strong>in</strong>e” pipe breaks need<br />

not be considered as design basis accidents. While this argument has technical merit <strong>in</strong><br />

many cases, it has not been generally accepted by regulatory bodies. Release of<br />

radioactivity due to pip<strong>in</strong>g leaks <strong>in</strong> general is easily conf<strong>in</strong>ed with<strong>in</strong> the conta<strong>in</strong>ment.<br />

Pip<strong>in</strong>g breaks ‐ Breaks <strong>in</strong> the primary system pip<strong>in</strong>g give rise to one of the major<br />

classes of design basis accidents (DBA). The LBLOCA is the classical DBA for the<br />

design of the emergency core cool<strong>in</strong>g systems and the conta<strong>in</strong>ment. SBLOCA have also<br />

been studied extensively, especially s<strong>in</strong>ce the TMI‐2 accident, which was essentially a<br />

SBLOCA, led to large‐scale core melt<strong>in</strong>g and radionuclide release to the conta<strong>in</strong>ment.<br />

The design requirement is to show that cladd<strong>in</strong>g temperature, cladd<strong>in</strong>g oxidation, and<br />

conta<strong>in</strong>ment pressure rema<strong>in</strong> with<strong>in</strong> acceptable bounds, so that fuel <strong>in</strong>tegrity and<br />

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