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Regional Basic Professional Training Course in Korea

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<strong>Regional</strong> <strong>Basic</strong> <strong>Professional</strong> <strong>Tra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g</strong> <strong>Course</strong> (BPTC) on Nuclear Safety<br />

Article 2 (Repeal of Notice) Notice of the MOST No.1994‐10 "Regulation on Safety<br />

Classification and Applicable Codes and Standards for Nuclear Reactor Facilities" is<br />

repealed at the time this notice enters <strong>in</strong>to force.<br />

TABLE 6.2. Transfer matrix for correlation of the IAEA safety classification to Regulation on<br />

Safety Classification and Applicable Codes and Standards for Nuclear Reactor<br />

Facilities (Notice of the M<strong>in</strong>ister of Education, Science and Technology No.2008‐13)<br />

Safety class (IAEA) Safety class <strong>in</strong> Notice of MEST No. 2008‐13<br />

1 �Prevention of release<br />

of core fission product<br />

<strong>in</strong>ventory to the<br />

environment<br />

2 1. Mitigation of<br />

accident<br />

consequences,<br />

otherwise release of<br />

core fission products<br />

<strong>in</strong>ventory to<br />

environment<br />

2. Prevention that<br />

anticipated<br />

operational<br />

occurrences lead to<br />

accidents (except<br />

those safety<br />

functions support<strong>in</strong>g<br />

another safety<br />

function)<br />

3. Functions which<br />

could result <strong>in</strong> a<br />

large product of<br />

failure consequence<br />

and probability that<br />

1 Pressure reta<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g portions and supports of mechanical<br />

equipment that form part of the reactor coolant pressure<br />

boundary (RCPB) whose failure could cause a loss of reactor<br />

coolant exceed<strong>in</strong>g the reactor coolant normal makeup<br />

capability<br />

2 Pressure reta<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g portions and supports of primary<br />

conta<strong>in</strong>ment, and to pressure‐reta<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g portions and supports<br />

that are not <strong>in</strong>cluded <strong>in</strong> SC‐1 and are designed to accomplish<br />

the follow<strong>in</strong>g nuclear safety functions that:<br />

1. provide fission product barrier or primary conta<strong>in</strong>ment<br />

radioactive material holdup or isolation;<br />

2. provide emergency heat removal for the primary<br />

conta<strong>in</strong>ment atmosphere to an <strong>in</strong>termediate heat s<strong>in</strong>k, or<br />

emergency removal of radioactive material from the<br />

primary conta<strong>in</strong>ment atmosphere (e.g. conta<strong>in</strong>ment spray);<br />

3. <strong>in</strong>troduce emergency negative reactivity to make the reactor<br />

sub‐critical (e.g. boron <strong>in</strong>jection system), or restrict the<br />

addition of positive reactivity via pressure boundary<br />

equipment;<br />

4. ensure emergency core cool<strong>in</strong>g where the equipment<br />

provides coolant directly to the core (e.g. residual heat<br />

removal and emergency core cool<strong>in</strong>g); or<br />

5. provide or ma<strong>in</strong>ta<strong>in</strong> sufficient reactor coolant <strong>in</strong>ventory for<br />

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