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Regional Basic Professional Training Course in Korea

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<strong>Regional</strong> <strong>Basic</strong> <strong>Professional</strong> <strong>Tra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g</strong> <strong>Course</strong> (BPTC) on Nuclear Safety<br />

1.157, must provide sufficient justification to show that the analytical technique<br />

realistically describes the behavior of the reactor system dur<strong>in</strong>g a loss‐of‐coolant accident.<br />

Comparisons to applicable experimental data must be made and uncerta<strong>in</strong>ties <strong>in</strong> the<br />

analysis method and <strong>in</strong>puts must be identified and assessed so that the uncerta<strong>in</strong>ty <strong>in</strong> the<br />

calculated results can be estimated. This uncerta<strong>in</strong>ty must be accounted for, so that, when<br />

the calculated ECCS cool<strong>in</strong>g performance is compared to the ECCS acceptance criteria<br />

such as maximum cladd<strong>in</strong>g temperature, oxidation and hydrogen generation, etc., there is<br />

a high level of probability that the criteria would not be exceeded.<br />

8.7.3. ECCS Design<br />

The Emergency Core Cool<strong>in</strong>g System (ECCS) is designed to provide core cool<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> the<br />

unlikely event of a Loss‐of‐Coolant‐Accident (LOCA). The ECCS prevents significant<br />

alteration of core geometry, precludes fuel melt<strong>in</strong>g, limits the cladd<strong>in</strong>g metal‐water<br />

reaction, removes the energy generated <strong>in</strong> the core and ma<strong>in</strong>ta<strong>in</strong>s the core subcritical<br />

dur<strong>in</strong>g the extended period of time follow<strong>in</strong>g a LOCA.<br />

The ECCS accomplished these functional requirements by use of redundant active and<br />

passive <strong>in</strong>jection subsystems. The active portion of the ECCS consists of high and low<br />

pressure safety <strong>in</strong>jection and associated valves; the passive portion consists of pressurized<br />

safety <strong>in</strong>jection tank (SIT), pip<strong>in</strong>g and <strong>in</strong>strumentation. Figure 8.7‐1 shows the schematic<br />

diagram of ECCS for the <strong>Korea</strong> Standard Nuclear Plant (KSNP), which <strong>in</strong>cludes the<br />

refuel<strong>in</strong>g water tank (RWT) and conta<strong>in</strong>ment recirculation sump [7]. In addition, the<br />

safety <strong>in</strong>jection system functions to <strong>in</strong>ject borated water <strong>in</strong>to the reactor coolant system to<br />

add negative reactivity to the core <strong>in</strong> the unlikely event of a steaml<strong>in</strong>e rupture. Safety<br />

<strong>in</strong>jection is also <strong>in</strong>itiated <strong>in</strong> the event of a steam generator tube rupture or a CEA ejection<br />

<strong>in</strong>cident. The system is actuated automatically.<br />

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