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Regional Basic Professional Training Course in Korea

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<strong>Regional</strong> <strong>Basic</strong> <strong>Professional</strong> <strong>Tra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g</strong> <strong>Course</strong> (BPTC) on Nuclear Safety<br />

<strong>in</strong> the frequency of high magnitude seismic events.<br />

Accident del<strong>in</strong>eation<br />

The identification of accident lead<strong>in</strong>g to core damage is undertaken by the use of event<br />

trees that are developed for each <strong>in</strong>itiat<strong>in</strong>g event. The questions asked at the top of an<br />

event tree usually concern the success or failure of front l<strong>in</strong>e systems that may be used to<br />

prevent core damage. The accident <strong>in</strong>itiation and the system success/failure questions are<br />

diagrammed sequentially <strong>in</strong> the order that they affect the course of the accident. The tree<br />

branches at po<strong>in</strong>ts where the systems either succeed on <strong>in</strong> their functions.<br />

The failure of the system is determ<strong>in</strong>ed from a logical model called a fault tree, which<br />

express the system’s failure probability as a function of the failure probabilities of its<br />

components and support<strong>in</strong>g systems. For a particular event called the top event(usually a<br />

failure of a system to perform some extended function), a fault tree is used to identify the<br />

comb<strong>in</strong>ation of base events (usually component failures or operator errors) that could<br />

lead to the top event. Due to the fact that the safety systems are usually redundant, it is<br />

important to take <strong>in</strong>to account common mode failures that are simultaneous failures of<br />

multiple components due to some underly<strong>in</strong>g common cause such as design errors or<br />

environmental factors.<br />

Human factor analyses are <strong>in</strong>corporated<strong>in</strong>to current state of the art PSA studies:<br />

unavailability of components due to ma<strong>in</strong>tenance errors; and failure of operators to<br />

follow written procedures under normal operat<strong>in</strong>g and accident conditions.<br />

9.1.5. PSA level 2 [9.5-6]<br />

9.1.5.1. PSA level 2 objectives<br />

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