C. Wiebes - Intelligence en de oorlog in Bosnië 1992-1995. De rol van de inlichtingen- en veiligheidsdiensten - Engels

100the authorities should be extremely cautious in giving information on combat actions, and on thenationalities of the attacking aircraft. 453As the Head of the MIS/CO, Kok is also said to have urgently advised Defence MinisterVoorhoeve, shortly after his appointment, to pull out of Srebrenica. Like his predecessor, the Head ofthe MIS was also confronted with CDS Van der Vlis, who must have been in despair about the positionin which Dutchbat had ended up in Srebrenica. On his appointment, Kok therefore wanted adiscussion with the Minister as soon as possible, but according to Kok the Minister was shielded by theSecretary-General, a state of affairs which Kok found extremely frustrating. 454 Later, it did becomepossible for the Head of the MIS/CO to brief Voorhoeve on a regular basis. The Minister did havesome interest in the work of the MIS, but this mainly involved the integration of the services and notthe military information that the MIS had to offer. The problem for Kok was that he was given nopolitical guidance by Voorhoeve, and had to write his own statement of requirements. Voorhoevenever informed the MIS or Kok what sort of information he actually required from the MIS.For all these reasons, the MIS under Kok played hardly any role in the conflict in Bosnia.Neither was the MIS accepted as a serious discussion partner by the political policymakers, as was also455confirmed by Voorhoeve. The MIS did arrange daily briefings in the Defence Crisis ManagementCentre on the political and military intentions of the warring factions, but when the briefing was over,the MIS had to leave and the doors were closed.The information position of the MIS in the period of the fall of the enclave was also not terriblyimpressive. There were no contacts at a strategic level with the Scandinavian countries or the UnitedKingdom, which had troops in the vicinity. Furthermore, Eibergen was still geared towards a Cold Warmentality and absolutely not towards Yugoslavia, so that no Sigint on Yugoslavia was gathered there.What is more, at the time of the fall of the enclave Eibergen still reported to the Commander-in-Chiefof the RNLA, who demanded that the unit continue to operate according to the old East-Westmentality. That was the order on the table, and it was not to be deviated from. In Eibergen and withinthe RNLA it was seen as a ‘mortal sin’ to glance in the direction of conflicts that did not fit into thatmould.Organizational problems exacerbated the situation still further. The fact that Eibergen was notallowed to do anything on ‘Bosnia’, coincided with resistance to a further integration of the three MISsof the Armed Forces, a process which only started to gain momentum in 1994. Senior RNLA officersblocked this integration, because they wanted to preserve the MIS/Army. 456 Couzy confirmed that hehad never ordered Eibergen to step up its activities regarding Bosnia. As Commander-in-Chief of theRoyal Netherlands Army he did not have the impression that important information was beingwithheld from him in the sphere of Sigint. 457Otherwise, the image that the MIS/CO was entirely uninvolved in Bosnia deserves somecorrection. It was even clear to Kok as Head of the MIS that the enclave would disappear in duecourse. This was confirmed to him by a meeting in the first half of 1994 with his Hungariancounterpart in Budapest. He brought Kok into contact with the Head of the Serbian MIS, whoconfirmed the picture that the enclaves would disappear in the long term. Ideas were occasionallyexchanged after that in the MIS management meetings, and consideration was given to using Dutch F-16s to take photos of Srebrenica. This did not happen because the Air Force thought that it was neitherpossible nor permissible. The MIS/Air Force was focused on protecting the security of Air Forcepersonnel, and their assessment was that such an action could put them in danger.In early 1995, it was more or less known that Kok had to leave. From that moment on, theMISs of the Armed Forces no longer wished to share any information with each other and with the453 MoD, Archive CDS 1994, No. 2854, HMID Kok to the Secretary-General, No. DIS/94/095/856, 13/04/94.454 Interview with P . Kok, 07/06/00 .455 Interview with J. Voorhoeve, 01/10/01.456 Confidential interview (41) and interview with J. Vandewijer, 27/01/00.457 Interview with H. Couzy, 04/10/01.