C. Wiebes - Intelligence en de oorlog in Bosnië 1992-1995. De rol van de inlichtingen- en veiligheidsdiensten - Engels

147Later that day, Galbraith reported to the State Department: ‘This matter is time-urgent.’ He wasreferring to the fact that the Croatian prime minister, Mikica Valentic, was due to depart for Teheranon 29 April. Without an American ‘green light’ the trip was cancelled. Galbraith proposed usingdisguised Iranian Boeing 747s for the supplies. Half of the consignment of arms would be destined forCroatia and the other half for the Bosnian Muslims. 704The die is cast in WashingtonGalbraith approached Alexander Vershbow, the Assistant Secretary of State for Bosnia, who passed theproblem on to the Deputy Secretary of State, Strobe Talbott, and to Lake. Both understood thedilemma: the disadvantage was that Iran would be drawn into the region. This could have majorconsequences and could even cause the sudden collapse of the Muslim-Croat Federation. Theadvantage was that it would finally assure assistance to the Bosnian Muslims.Meanwhile, State Department lawyers assessed the operation. They came to the conclusion thatencouraging a foreign government to procure arms from Iran was not a secret action. 705 Talbott andLake decided to inform Galbraith that he had no instructions: ‘a deft way or saying that the UnitedStates would not actively object.’On 27 April 1994, Lake and Talbott discussed this with Clinton on board Air Force One. It wasthen decided to give a green light to the arms supplies from Iran to Croatia. The opponents werethereby overruled: Christopher was confronted with a fait accompli, and CIA director Woolsey was notinformed at all.706 According to Redman, Lake had ‘come around’ and he was the man behind the ideaof supplying arms to the ABiH. The ‘No instructions’ instruction to Galbraith and Redman came fromLake. 707 Doubts remained about Iran’s possible role, but the complete change in policy rapidly becameclear. 708 At first Galbraith did not understand the ‘no instructions’ message. He wondered whether itmeant that he should give Tudjman the green light. He phoned the Europe chief of the NationalSecurity Council, Jenonne Walker, who then consulted Lake. Walker then phoned Galbraith back: ‘noinstructions’ was what Lake had said to her but ‘Tony [Lake] was smiling when he said it.’ 709 On 28April 1994, the architect of the Muslim-Croat federation, Charles Redman, accompanied by Galbraith,visited the Croatian president, Tudjman. Redman told him that Washington would have no objection toa clandestine channel through which arms would be transported to Bosnia. They told Tudjmanspecifically that they had ‘no instructions’ on this sensitive subject. Lake had again impressed upon thetwo American diplomats on 2 May that it was unnecessary to report on their ‘no instructions’discussion with Tudjman to the State Department. 710Tudjman did not understand this message at first, was confused and asked for clarification onthe following day. Galbraith then said to him: ‘focus not only on what I had said yesterday but what Ihad not said.’ Redman was clearer: ‘We don’t want to be the ones who say no to this.’ 711 That was all704 James Risen, ‘Closer U.S. role seen on Bosnia Iran arms pipeline’, Los Angeles Times, 23/12/96. See also: James Hill,‘Unwrap Arms Deal’, The Phoenix Gazette, 27/12/96.705 Report of the Select Committee on Intelligence US Senate, U.S. Actions Regarding Iranian and Other Arms Transfers to theBosnian Army, 1994-1995, Washington DC, 1996, p. 4.706 Walter Pincus, ‘Woolsey, in testimony, Criticizes White House’, The Washington Post, 11/06/96.707 Interview with Charles Redman, 27/06/01.708 Halberstam, War in a Time of Peace, pp. 332-340.709 James Risen & Doyle McManus, ‘U.S. had options to let Bosnia get arms’, Los Angeles Times, 14/07/96.710 Report of the Select Committee on Intelligence US Senate, U.S Actions Regarding Iranian and Other Arms Transfers to theBosnian Army, 1994-1995, Washington DC, 1996, p. 4.711 James Risen & Doyle McManus, ‘U.S. Envoy May Have Aided Arms Convoy to Bosnia’, The Los Angeles Times,17/04/96; Report of the Select Committee on Intelligence US Senate, U.S. Actions Regarding Iranian and Other Arms Transfersto the Bosnian Army, 1994-1995, Washington DC, 1996, p. 13; Ed Vulliamy, ‘Clinton’s Irangate spooks CIA’, The Observer,02/06/96 and Cohen, Hearts grown brutal, pp. 314-317.