C. Wiebes - Intelligence en de oorlog in Bosnië 1992-1995. De rol van de inlichtingen- en veiligheidsdiensten - Engels

62intelligence officers even told the author Ljiljana Bulatovic that the Bosnian General Rasim Delic hadorganized the attack. 271Various interviews reveal that the French intelligence services generally leaned towards to theBritish position on the war in Bosnia. However, a conflict of competence arose in response to the farreachingFrench involvement in UNPROFOR and the conflict in Bosnia between the foreignintelligence service (DGSE) and military intelligence service (DRM). Indeed in October 1994, anofficial agreement had to be made between these two services to delineate their tasks. This was alsonecessary because the two directors, Jacques Dewatre and General Jean Heinrich, were constantly atodds with each other. Furthermore, General Jean Heinrich frequently quarrelled with GeneralRaymond Germanos, the Chief of Operations of the French Army, and this would give rise to manyproblems in Bosnia. 272The quarrel was ultimately settled to the advantage of the French DGSE, which was givenexclusive authority to conduct clandestine operations in other countries and to run agents and sources.From now on the French military intelligence service would have to rely for the gathering ofintelligence on the military attachés in the French embassies and uniformed officers, such as thoseserving with UNPROFOR. Senior officials of the French DGSE confirmed that their service hadreceived an unprecedented flow of foreign requests for intelligence since the outbreak of the crisis inthe Balkans. The DGSE was extremely active in Bosnia, and the sharply increased pressure of work hadled to the recruitment of five hundred civilians in the five years since the start of the war. 273Incidentally, the director of the French foreign intelligence service, Dewatre, later had to resign becausethe service’s operations in Serbia had misfired. 274German intelligence services also had a biased assessment: they were pro-Croatian, but leanttowards the American anti-Serb position. The foreign intelligence service, the Bundesnachrichtendienst(BND), was always very concerned (like the Italian and Austrian services) about the situation inYugoslavia. These services expected major disturbances already after Tito’s death and, according to aformer BND official, had a better understanding of the ethnic and cultural problems there, comparedto other services. The German service collected much intelligence by operating with special teams whodebriefed refugees in Germany or Bosnia itself. There was a serious fear for the German nationalsecurity in view of the enormous influx of refugees from the Balkan. In particular because there workedin Germany already more than 1 million Yugoslav immigrant workers. 275The BND is said to have also cooperated closely with Croatian intelligence services, such as theBureau for National Security (Ured za Nacionalnu Sigurnost), the intelligence service of the Croatian Army(OSHV), the intelligence service of the General Staff of the Croatian Army and the SecurityInformation Service. It is noteworthy, incidentally, that these Croatian services operated actively andspecifically against UNPROFOR. For instance, Bureau IV of the intelligence service of the CroatianArmy was responsible for military Communications Intelligence (Comint) operations against theheadquarters of UNPROFOR in Zagreb, which were carried out from the air force base Lucko inZagreb. This section was said to have maintained close links with the BND and CIA. The Germansmade equipment available to both and arranged training and education. In addition, NATOintelligence, including Sigint, is said to have flowed via the BND to the Croatian services, to the greatdissatisfaction of the NATO member states, especially because the Serbian intelligence and securityservices (such as SDB and KOS) had heavily infiltrated the Croatian services. Intelligence supplied by271 Bulatovic, General Mladic, pp. 125-126, 129 and 131.272 ‘Changes at the Top in French Intelligence’, Intelligence Newsletter, No. 266, 15/06/95.273 Protocole d’accord DGSE-DRM’, Le Monde Du Renseignement, No. 249, 06/10/94.274 Chuck Sudetic, ‘The Reluctant Gendarme’, The Atlantic Monthly, April 2000.275 Confidential information (86) and confidential interview (98).