C. Wiebes - Intelligence en de oorlog in Bosnië 1992-1995. De rol van de inlichtingen- en veiligheidsdiensten - Engels

325by the Norwegian Brigadier General Haukland, Commander of SNE, who said that the UNMOs had adifficult time and knew no more than Dutchbat. They had no freedom of movement and the team wasnot able to travel through the region around Srebrenica. 1800 This is also clear from the reports made bythe UNMOs and their later debriefing following their return from Srebrenica. A Dutch UNMO, MajorA. de Haan, did however report that on 2 June rumours were circulating with regard to an attack onOP-E. A day later these rumours proved to be true. Their report showed that the attack on OP-E wasevaluated by the UNMOs on 3 June as an operation aimed at gaining control of the southern road, 1801and not taking over the enclave itself. Furthermore, the report portrayed things as not so serious. Atthat time neither the observers nor anyone in Dutchbat imagined that the Bosnian Serbs would take theentire enclave. It was however thought that the VRS might try to carve off pieces of the enclave. 1802The loss of OP-E was not experienced as a shock within SNE. Ken Biser, the head of CivilAffairs, stated in his weekly report of 9 June that this was not a surprise. It had long been known thatthe VRS wanted to use the southern road. If UNPROFOR was not prepared to permit this ‘they mightfeel the need to take it by force’. In a summary Biser wrote that on the basis of the ‘rhetoric of the pastfew days, I warned that they would seize it by force. I did not think they would do it prior to Sunday orMonday though.’ Biser did however expect problems in the long term. Moreover, the Bosniangovernor in Tuzla had urged that OP-E be regained ‘without regard to civilian casualties from anysubsequent shelling’, as in the event of such a retaking the VRS would shell the enclave. In Biser’sopinion the situation around the road would probably escalate, because the VRS was already using it. Itwould not be long before the ABiH started setting up ambushes. In turn the VRS would then takereprisals and shell the enclave, and would then proceed with ‘seizure of additional territory’. 1803However, things remained fairly quiet until the start of July. 1804The first sign that the VRS intended to do something around Srebrenica was the arrival of agroup of staff officers of the Drina Corps in Eastern Bosnia at the end of June, 1805 led by the Chief ofStaff of the Drina Corps (and after 13 July its commander), Major General Radislav Krstic. Thismarked the start of the planning for Operation Krivaja ‘95. 1806 On 2 July this led to the issue of anoperations plan by the Drina Corps. The aim of Krivaja ‘95 was to separate the enclaves of Zepa andSrebrenica, to reduce them to the built-up areas and to create the conditions for their ‘elimination’. Thisgoal was to be achieved with a surprise attack. Units around the enclave were ordered to conduct anactive defence, while separate combat units were to reduce the enclaves. Full radio silence was to beobserved so that no military traffic could be monitored.The consulted Bosnian Serb sources claim that the continual ABiH sorties from the enclavewere a major reason for this operation. The former Chief of the General Staff of the VRS and laterMinister of Defence of the Republika Srpska, General Manojlo Milanovic, stated that the attack was aresponse to the sortie towards Visnjica, in the direction of the headquarters of the VRS in Han Pijesak.1807This attack resulted in many civilian casualties. The historian Milivoje Ivanisevic also believed thatthe attack on Srebrenica was caused by the ABiH sorties. In order to prevent a repetition the ABiHlines had to be taken. 1808 The journalist Zoran Jovanovic, at the time the information officer of theDrina Corps, confirmed when asked that the murder of the five VRS woodcutters close to Milici on 28May and the sortie on 26 June near Visnjica, followed by an attack on a VRS signals patrol at CrnaRijeka (three kilometres from the headquarters of the Drina Corps) prompted Mladic to take definitive1800 Interview with H. Haukland, 03/05/99.1801 SMG. UNMO SNE to UNMO HQ, Sarajevo, No. IN 854, 03/06/95. The UNMO headquarters at BHC came to thesame verdict. UNMO, BHC to UNMO, HQ Zagreb, No. IN. 891, 04/06/95.1802 Interview with L.C. van Duijn, 02/07/99.1803 UNGE, UNROFOR, Box 55. Biser to Joseph, SSN 467, 05/06/95 and Biser to Corwin, SSN 209, 09/06/95.1804 How the VRS attacked is described in detail in Chapter 5 of Part III of the Srebrenica report.1805 This brief reconstruction draws on Part III (Chapters 5 and 6) of the Srebrenica report.1806 ICTY (IT-98-33) OTP Ex. 403/a, Butler Report, p. 6 and 15.1807 Interview with Manojlo Milovanovic, 18/11/98.1808 Interview with Milovoje Ivanisevic, 17/09/99.