C. Wiebes - Intelligence en de oorlog in Bosnië 1992-1995. De rol van de inlichtingen- en veiligheidsdiensten - Engels

364take the whole pocket’. If the VRS did however attack, it was not expected that the ABiH would beable to stop this. The Bosnian Muslims might be able to delay the assault for a few days, but ‘they arenot strong enough to halt indefinitely a pre-planned assault’. The UN was also not in a position to‘dissuade or prevent’ the VRS from such an action. Armed resistance by Dutchbat ‘would be of novalue even if the UN mandate authorised such action’. The nature of the terrain and the small numberof VRS soldiers required for such an attack ‘would render air strikes relatively ineffective as apreventative measure; NATO would have difficulty in acquiring worthwhile targets as the VRS forceswould be relatively dispersed.’The VRS did not need to bring in troops from elsewhere because the local units were sufficient.It would thus be difficult ‘to identify a VRS attack before it had begun. It is anticipated that if the VRSdid decide to attack Srebrenica there would very little, if any, warning time.’ The VRS would not besignificantly deterred by the presence of the UN once the final decision had been taken to attackSrebrenica. However, there were no indications that the VRS had taken a ‘command decision’ to attackSrebrenica, although this ‘does not preclude opportunistic campaigns as happened in Gorazde lastyear’. If the VRS did however attack then ‘there would be little or no warning from imagery; the VRSdo not need to move troops and equipment into the area to take the enclaves, the local troops aresufficient in number for the task’. In reality it was only the forbearance of the VRS that allowed andenabled the continued existence of the enclave. Srebrenica and Zepa had always been completelyindefensible, according to the UK Defence Intelligence Staff. 2056This analysis was confirmed by British intelligence officials. The DIS had no hard tacticalintelligence on the attack. The concentration of troops had been noted, but the service had attachedlittle importance to this because in fact the VRS constantly had sufficient troops at its disposal. Theintelligence about the ‘massing of troops’ that was supplied was chiefly obtained through Imint. Thesepictures definitely did not indicate that the VRS was about to start an assault. Furthermore, it should beremembered that Srebrenica was not a major area of attention for the DIS. Its eyes were turnedtowards Gorazde and Sarajevo. 2057Up to a week before the actual attack the service did not reckon on a planned attack. It can beassumed that the DIS analysis was based in part on information obtained from other British servicessuch as SIS and GCHQ and on intelligence supplied by foreign partners such as US and Canadianagencies. This was confirmed by Dame Pauline Neville-Jones, who was the chairwoman of the BritishJoint Intelligence Committee in 1993-1994. Srebrenica came as an enormous surprise; there were noprior indications. Mladic conducted the operation without consulting others. ‘London was completelyignorant as regards the upcoming attack.’ 2058 It must be concluded that foreign intelligence and securityservices did not have specific operational information or hard indications from sources and technicalintelligence resources indicating that the Bosnian Serbs would move to attack Srebrenica on a particulardate. Indeed, the presence of such information was not likely either in view of the very short-termpreparations needed by the VRS to set up the operation. 20598. ConclusionsMany organizations and persons expected that in the long term the eastern enclaves would be given upand would disappear. At the diplomatic level, as early as the start of 1994 the eastern Safe Areas wereseen as an obstacle to the peace process that needed to be ‘cleared up’. The US mediator Redman hadalready made reasonable progress in persuading the Bosnians to give up the Safe Areas; abandoningand exchanging these areas were options that Sarajevo was prepared to discuss, but it remained a very2056 NIOD, Coll. van den Breemen. DIS Assessment of the UN’s Prospects in the event of a VRS Assault on Srebrenica as at30 June 1995, NATO Restricted, 30/06/95, appendix to letter from Inge to Van den Breemen.2057 Confidential interviews (8) and (43).2058 Interview with P. Neville-Jones, 15/11/01.2059 Confidential information (83).