C. Wiebes - Intelligence en de oorlog in Bosnië 1992-1995. De rol van de inlichtingen- en veiligheidsdiensten - Engels

163the convoys from Croatia with arms and ammunition had increased considerably, and in other parts ofBosnia the same observations were made. 809 In the spring, Dutchbat would also establish that the ABiHreceived new arms from Tuzla and that training was being stepped up. 810 This news spread rapidly, andin due course this could only have negative consequences for the clandestine arms supplies to theABiH. The American pressure on Le Hardy was apparently increased, because he ‘became involved inan acrimonious exchange with Americans on this subject’. 811 Under apparent American pressure (seebelow in this chapter) he produced a second report on 18 February in which he stated that his earlierreport was incorrect and he made recommendations for achieving more accurate reporting from thenon. According to him, no one had seen the aircraft - which was not true - but only heard it. He alsomade a number of suggestions so that the Norwegians could report better. 812 This second report isremarkable: on the one hand Le Hardy states that all alleged observations of the Hercules were wrong,but at the same time he makes a wide variety of recommendations, including stationing a Danish tankon Tuzla Air Base, to control the Highway Strip and to occupy more favourable positions, to improvethe chance of actual ‘hard’ observations.On the question regarding Black Flights, the commander of the Norwegian battalion, ColonelG. Arlefalk, stated that his soldiers sometimes reported six to eight aircraft to him, approaching fromthe direction of Brcko. The aircraft flew low and mostly without lights. One night, Arlefalk himself sawa Hercules approximately at 100 metres above his head at 03.00 hours. Arlefalk himself had flown in aC-130 on several occasions, and its sound and silhouette were unmistakable according to him. Atemporary observation post was set up to gain a better view of these flights. In response to one of hisreports, he was told that they had been AWACS, and moreover that they had been much further to the813east: ‘all the soldiers laughed themselves silly when that answer came’, Arlefalk said. It is clear, and LeHardy’s second report in no way detracts from this, that aircraft were observed above Tuzla inFebruary that landed on the Highway Strip or ejected their load from a very low altitude. It wasabundantly clear to all parties that something was going on. 814 There were even aerial photographs ofcrates on the Highway Strip. 815Awareness of the Black Flights under the Bosnian SerbsAll in all, sufficient evidence exists that these flights took place. However, little protest was forthcomingfrom the Bosnian Serbs, and the question is why that was the case. No definite answer was obtained tothis question. 816 The VRS was in any case well aware of these flights. On 13 and 24 February 1995,General Mladic sent letters to General De Lapresle in Zagreb and to General Smith in Sarajevo.According to Mladic, aircraft had landed in Tuzla on these days, escorted by two jet fighters, and theyhad delivered arms and ammunition. Mladic complained that this had happened in front of the eyes ofUNPROFOR, but they had not intervened. He accused UNPROFOR of bias and stated that from nowon he could no longer guarantee the safety of NATO aircraft in the air space. 817 On 5 March 1995,Mladic again complained to General Smith about the flights. 818It was also possible to deduce that the VRS was well aware of the state of affairs from aninterview with the former Minister of Information of the Republika Srpska, Miroslav Toholj. He wasminister from 1993-1996 and asserted that the Bosnian Serb regime in Pale realized all too well that the809 O’shea, Crisis at Bihac, p. 157.810 For example: MoD, Sitreps. Milinfo DutchBat, 25/04/95, 02/05/95, 08/05/95 and 14/05/95.811 Simms, Unfinest Hour, p. 202.812 Confidential collection (12), Colonel Le Hardy to NordBat, no. 3471.3/TAB/008, 18/02/95.813 Interview with G. Arlefalk, 18/05/00.814 For example: ‘Muslimanski ‘fantomi’ u Tuzla’, Borba, 01/03/95.815 Confidential interview (31) and confidential information (32).816 Confidential interview (67).817 O’shea, Crisis at Bihac, p. 161. See also: interview with Eric-Lars Wahlgren, 03/06/99.818 UNNY, DPKO. Akashi to Annan, Z-363, 06/03/95.